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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation explores models of heterogeneous product markets that rely on the 
"vertical product differentiation" formulation, where products differ in their quality levels 
and consumers differ in their willingness to pay for quality. The demand structure applied 
here is the covered-market configuration under the vertical product differentiation. With this 
specification, product market equilibria of the monopoly and duopoly market are derived. In 
particular, parameter restrictions on the degree of relative consumer heterogeneity associated 
with the covered-market setting are identified and used to interpret analytical results. Based 
on the specified demand structure, I revisit two industrial organization topics from the 
perspectives of vertical product differentiation. 
The first essay analyzes the entry of a new product into a vertically differentiated 
market where an entrant and an incumbent compete in prices. Many models on strategic 
entry deterrence deal with "limit quantities" as the established firm's strategic tool to deter or 
accommodate entry. Here, however, the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent firm 
rely on "limit qualities". With a sequential choice of quality, quality-dependent marginal 
production cost, and a fixed entry cost, I relate the entry-quality decision and the entry-
deterrence strategies to the level of an entry cost and the degree of consumer heterogeneity. 
In particular, the incumbent influences the quality choice of the entrant by choosing its 
quality level before the entrant. This allows the incumbent to "limit" the entrant's entry 
decision and quality levels. Quality-dependent marginal production costs in the model entail 
the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as the incumbent's aggressive entry-deterrence 
strategies by increasing its quality level towards potential entry. Welfare evaluation confirms 
that social welfare is not necessarily improved when entry is encouraged rather than deterred. 
The second essay is motivated by some specific economic questions that have arisen 
with the introduction of 'genetically modified' (GM) agricultural products. A duopoly 
market-entry model associated with the vertical product differentiation is developed to show 
how the existence of segregation costs biases the firm's quality choice behavior. Thus, the 
key factor of the model is the cost of segregation activities that are necessary to distinguish 
vi 
GM products from non-GM products. With an increasing and convex cost of quality, the 
model predicts that the entrant firm has an increased incentive to enter the market with a low-
quality good to reduce production costs if segregation costs are sufficiently high. When 
consumers are homogeneous enough, however, entry may occur with the high-quality good. 
1 
CHAPTER 1. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Product differentiation is an important subject in the field of industrial 
organization since Chamberlain's (1933) model of monopolistic competition. The reason 
is that most products sold by firms are not identical but truly differentiated, i.e., 
consumers do not view such goods as perfect substitutes. Differentiation models intend 
to explain which goods will be produced in a specified economy. In Chamberlain - type 
monopolistic competition models, each consumer is allowed to buy all varieties. In a 
discrete choice model, however, each consumer is allowed to buy only one variety. 
Families of such discrete-choice product differentiation models are of two fundamental 
types: one is the "horizontal product differentiation" (HPD) model of Hotelling (1929), 
where product varieties are characterized by the different consumers' opinions, and the 
other is the "vertical product differentiation" (VPD) model where product qualities are 
ranked in the same way by consumers.1 Thus, while all products can have positive 
market share at the same price with the HPD structure, only one product will be bought if 
products are offered at the same price with the VPD structure. This dissertation focuses 
on the VPD approach, and develops a set of models to address some economic issues in 
this area. 
1.1 An Overview of VPD Models 
VPD is defined as the case in which all consumers prefer the higher quality 
when all varieties are offered at the same price (Shaked and Sutton, 1983). In the 
standard VPD model of Mussa and Rosen (1978) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), 
1 An interesting paper by Cremer and Thisse (1991), however, showed that the horizontal product 
differentiation is actually a special case of a VPD model if the marginal cost is a quadratic 
function of the quality. 
2 
consumers have heterogeneous preferences and each consumer buys only one variant. 
Mussa and Rosen-type models introduce a continuous distribution of consumers with 
differing preferences for qualities. In this framework it is therefore possible to express 
explicitly how demands are affected by quality differences.2 
Mussa and Rosen-type models have dominated VPD studies of firms' quality-
choice behavior, due to its yielding explicit form of demand for differentiated good. The 
extensive use of this model, in part, also is due to the convenient tools suggested by 
Tirole (1988), which is a simplified version of Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983). 
Previous quality-choice models were mostly carried out for a duopoly purely due to the 
complexity of dealing with the multiple discontinuities in profit functions. The basic 
VPD framework of duopoly entails two periods: quality choice followed by simultaneous 
product market competition, where each firm is allowed to offer only one quality.3 
Alternative studies recognized a sequential process of product innovation (e.g., Beath, 
Katsoulacos, and Ulph (1987) and Aoki and Prusa (1996)) or the timing of the 
introduction of new products incorporating learning-by-doing (e.g., Gruber (1992)) at the 
firm's stage of quality choice.4 Other important applications of the VPD model include 
minimum quality standards (e.g., Ronnen (1991) and Maxwell (1998)). 
Most models with heterogeneous consumer preferences use a linear indirect 
2 In contrast to this formulation, in Dixit (1979) - type representative consumer models such as 
Singh and Vives (1984), Bester and Petrakis (1993), and Lin and Saggi (2002), each consumer is 
allowed to buy all varieties. They used a quasi-linear utility function to derive linear demands 
and to eliminate income effects. In particular, because only the degree of product differentiation 
matters with this type of model, we cannot say that a good is superior to the others. 
3 As an exception, in a two-firm, two-stage game setting, Champsaur and Rochet (1989) 
examined a case where each firm is allowed to offer a whole range of qualities. 
4 For example, Aoki and Prusa (1996) analyzed how the timing of investment decisions affects 
the levels of quality chosen by firms. In their analysis, they showed that sequential quality 
choice induces duopolists to make smaller quality investments than they would in a game with 
simultaneous quality choice. 
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utility function for each type of consumer and a uniform distribution on consumers' 
tastes to obtain an explicit solution of the game, with attention restricted to the 
assumptions of an uncovered market (e.g., Ronnen (1991), Choi and Shin (1992), Motta 
(1993), Aoki and Prusa (1996), Lehman-Grube (1997), and Bonanno and Haworth 
(1998)) and covered market (e.g., Tirole (1988: 296-298), Rosenkranz (1995), and Pepall 
(1997)).5 The implicit assumption is that each consumer purchases at most one unit of 
goods or services.6 However, the representation of the firms' marginal production costs 
is different depending on the purpose of the study. Very simple quality-choice games are 
established in the absence of production costs, and by assuming that quality choice is 
costless (e.g., Choi and Shin (1992), Lehman-Grube (1997), and Tirole (1988)).7 In this 
case, however, qualities demanded are independent of qualities. In the model of Mussa 
and Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998), to avoid equilibria in which only 
the highest quality, yet the cheapest product is produced, quality-dependent constant 
marginal production cost is introduced, such that the higher quality good is assumed to 
be more expensive to manufacture. For example, quality improvement requires more 
skilled labor or expensive inputs. In this case, the quality-dependent marginal cost enters 
directly into the competitor's pricing strategy. Meanwhile, conventionally it is assumed 
that the R&D costs to bring about product innovation are sunk, convex, and strictly 
increasing in the quality level (e.g., part II of Motta (1993)). 
5 A duopoly market is said to be covered if all consumers purchase one unit of either good. In an 
uncovered market setting, some consumers are allowed not to purchase at all. 
6 In particular, the assumption of unit purchase seems realistic when dealing with professional 
services such as doctoral services and lawyer services. Also, when people would like to buy 
pianos, cars, and so on, the problem is not how many to buy but rather whether to buy and, if yes, 
what variety (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). 
7 However, results are not the same for this type of cost formulation. For example, assuming an 
uncovered market, Choi and Shin (1992) showed that the lower quality firm will choose a quality 
level which is a fixed proportion of the higher quality firm's choice. By contrast, Tirole (1988) 
shows that firms maximize product differentiation over the available range of qualities, with the 
covered-market assumption. 
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For duopoly VPD models, there are two important outcomes. First is the 
"maximal product differentiation" result that attains under the covered market setting. In 
a very simple quality-choice game model, Tirole (1988), by using the modified version 
of Shaked and Sutton (1982), showed that firms maximize product differentiation over 
the available range of qualities. Even though the model displays the absence of quality-
choice costs, because price competition is more intensified the less differentiated are the 
goods, price competition gives firms the incentive to differentiate their products. Thus, 
the optimal solution for the first stage problem is the maximal product differentiation 
where one firm chooses the minimum possible quality and the other firm chooses the 
maximum possible quality. The second result is the "high-quality advantage" where the 
firm choosing to produce the high-quality good earns a higher profit in equilibrium than 
does the low-quality firm under the assumption of quality-independent marginal 
production costs. Tirole (1988) and Choi and Shin (1992) showed this result with the 
simultaneous quality choice game. The high-quality advantage has been found to hold in 
a sequential quality choice game by Aoki and Prusa (1996) and Lehmann-Grube (1997). 
However, as we will show through proceeding chapters, both the "maximal 
product differentiation" and the "high-quality advantage" do not necessarily hold with 
the specification of quality-dependent variable costs. If one of the firms entered first 
(sequential choice of quality), that firm may not choose the high quality because no 
particular variety guarantees higher profits. In fact, there is a possibility of inferior 
quality entry. Also, with this cost specification, although firms want to differentiate 
products for strategic purpose (e.g., to soften price competition), qualities can be 
internally determined rather than maximally differentiated in the feasible quality interval. 
In many economic models associated with the homogeneous good market 
5 
analysis, there is a scope for extensions to the VPD setting associated with heterogeneity 
properties of the good and consumer preferences. For example, previous R&D models 
where product heterogeneity was not considered could be reformulated with the 
introduction of a VPD model (e.g., Greenstein and Ramey, 1998).8 In this context, this 
dissertation also introduces two familiar topics in homogeneous good market models, 
and provides more analyses from the VPD perspectives. 
1.2 Dissertation Organization 
The remaining parts of dissertation are organized in four chapters focusing on a 
static model of a market for differentiated products, where a set of products are 
heterogeneous. In chapter 2, the question how the vertically differentiated product 
market can be segmented is explicitly investigated. In particular, the monopoly and 
duopoly demand systems identified here are applied to the proceeding chapters. In 
chapter 3, I revisit the entry-deterrence strategies of an existing firm in the context of 
"limit qualities", which is an extension of the analysis of many models on strategic entry 
deterrence that deal with "limit quantities" as the established firm's strategic tool to deter 
or accommodate entry. In chapter 4, by introducing the market entry game associated 
with product R&D rather than process R&D, I analyze a specific question about how 
private decisions by an innovator bring inferior or superior technologies in the presence 
of segregation costs. The last chapter summarizes the dissertation and briefly outlines 
opportunities for additional research. 
8 Greenstein and Ramey (1998) reassessed Arrow's (1962) well-known result concerning the 
effect of market structure on the returns from process innovation, by using the framework of 
product innovations that are vertically differentiated from older products. 
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CHAPTER 2. DEMAND SYSTEMS AND PRODUCT 
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM 
In this dissertation, we follow a Mussa and Rosen (1978) or Shaked and Sutton 
(1982)-type VPD model to investigate firms' quality choices in the context of a non-
cooperative two-stage game of duopolists, where each firm is allowed to offer only one 
quality, and where investments in quality are made in the first stage and then product 
market competition occurs in the second stage. At present, we ignore which firm 
produces and sells which good. Following standard practice for this type of a model, we 
assume a linear indirect utility function for each consumer and also assume a uniform 
distribution of consumers' tastes. We restrict our attention to the covered market 
configuration for analytical tractability. 
2.1 Demand Structure under the Configuration of a Covered Market 
Suppose that, on the demand side of the market, a continuum of potential 
consumers is differentiated by the non-negative, one-dimensional taste parameter 6. 
The parameter 6 is assumed to be distributed uniformly with density 8 > 0 over an 
interval [0, 6 ], with 0 > Ô > 0. We normalize the indices as S = 1 and 0 -<9 = 1. When 
entry takes place, we have a situation with two goods differentiated by a quality index 
Xi e (0, co) , i- 1,2, that is observable to all. It is assumed that, as proposed by Mussa 
and Rosen (1978), the indirect utility function of a consumer Q patronizing good i is: 
(i) 
where Pi and Xi for i= {1, 2} are, respectively, the price and quality variables. Thus, 
consumers have identical preferences but differ in their taste parameter, 6 . Consumer 6 
7 
is willing to pay up to 6Xt dollars for one unit of the product i. Hence his or her 
surplus is expressed as Vi = 6Xt -Pt. In this setting, the consumer buys the good that 
provides the highest surplus or buys nothing if Vi < 0 for both goods. 
Three market outcomes arise from this type of demand structure. First is the 
case of a partially covered market. Because a consumer buys if and only if his or her net 
p 
surplus Vi = QXi - is positive, the marginal consumer 6>01 = — is indifferent between 
X\ 
buying a low-quality good 1 and not buying at all. Then consumers located at the low 
P -P 
end where 6 < &01 do not buy either good. By denoting as dn = — — the marginal 
consumer who is indifferent between buying good 1 and buying good 2, consumers 
between û0l and 0n buy the low-quality good, while consumers with 9 > 9n buy the 
high-quality good.1 Therefore, when the market is not covered, the demands for good 1 
and good 2 are, respectively, given by Ql = 0n - <901 and Q2-9 - 9U. Second is the case 
where a market is fully covered at the market equilibrium. For a market to be covered, 
the least value consumer for quality should have non-negative surplus by purchasing the 
(low-quality) good. That is, we need a parameter restriction 9 > 9in for this type of a 
market configuration. Third, both covered and uncovered market configurations have the 
possibility of the preempted market. If there does not exist sufficient heterogeneity 
among consumers, then only the firm offering the lowest quality good or the firm 
offering the highest quality good may get a positive market share at the market 
equilibrium. In other words, there may be a case where an inferior quality covers all the 
1 We follow the convention that a consumer indifferent between two products ( 0 = 6n ) is 
assumed to choose the product of higher quality. 
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product market while a superior quality is unmarketable, or vice versa. 
In this dissertation, we focus only on the covered market where all consumers 
purchase positive quantities of the good. Then, for given prices (Pv P2), the covered 
market demand systems incorporating the possibility of the preempted market case are: 
(2) <2i = max jo, min \Ô, 0n} - ûj 
G;=max{0, g}}, where ^ ^ . 
X2 X l  
Therefore, covered-market equilibrium can be characterized by the cases in which only 
the high-quality good is sold, only the low-quality good is sold, or both types of goods 
are present in the market. In particular, for the cases where both goods are present, the 
aggregate demand functions reflect a net substitution pattern (i.e., the cross price effect is 
positive). The market segmentation for each type of product is described in Figure 2.1. 
The consumer surplus for each type of product is on the vertical axis. The slope of the 
line is the quality level of each product. If there is an increase of product quality, the 
market interval for that good is enlarged while the market interval for its neighbor 
product shrinks. Then the following Remark 1 states the necessary condition for both 
goods to be transacted in the market equilibrium (e.g., Figure 2.1 (a)). 
Remark 1. Suppose that the market is covered. For both goods to be transacted in 
equilibrium, it is necessary that the quality-deflated price of the high quality good is 
greater than that of the low quality good. 
Proof: The necessary condition for a duopoly market can be proven by contradiction. 
Suppose that the quality-deflated price of the high quality good is less than or equal to 
P P XX 
that of the low quality good (i.e., — < — ). Then —- > —- , and by using the 
X2 Xl P2 P, 
individual rational constraint ( 6Xi > /> ) and the self-selection constraint ( P2 > Px ), it 
9 
follows that (ex2 - P2)- (ÔÀ\ -P i) = P2 
X A 
1 
V 
•1 > 
V * 
-1 k O .  
Hence, in that case, all consumers would always prefer good 2 to good 1, contradicting 
the condition for both goods to be transacted in equilibrium, a 
-P, 
-P, 
(a) When JL< A 
i k 
(b) When A = A. 
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(c)When 
Figure 2.1 Market Segmentation of Consumer Types 
In the analysis that follows, given qualities Xx and X2, we focus on interior 
solutions in which both goods are consumed in the market and all consumers are served 
in equilibrium. Then, when consumers differ in their tastes 9, the duopoly demand 
functions are defined by the following equations: 
(3) a = *£' f W e - s { F ( e „ ) ~ F ( e ) }  
Q i  =  s ^ f ( e y i e  =  s { F ( ë ) - F ( e l j \  
where /(•) is the probability density function of 9 and F {•) is the corresponding 
c u m u l a t i v e  d e n s i t y  f u n c t i o n .  A s s u m i n g  u n i f o r m  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  c o n s u m e r s ,  f ( d )  -  - 1  ,  
and normalizing indices as S = 1 and 9 -9 = 1, we have demand functions: 
11 
p -P 
where, again, 9n = — . 
X 2 - X \  
2.2 Product Market Equilibrium 
2.2.1 Monopoly Market Equilibrium 
Consider first the monopoly market equilibrium. Because consumers are 
passive about the market coverage, a monopolist can determine endogenously a covered 
or uncovered market. Thus, to invoke the assumption of full market coverage, we need 
to find the parameter restriction where the monopolist would cover the market. 
Demand for Monopoly 
Good 
: ' ; 
0 ^ 9 
Figure 2.2 Monopoly Market Segmentation 
„ p 
Let us denote 9 = —— (with a subscript 'M' standing for the "monopoly") as 
the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a good and not buying at all. 
Figure 2.2 describes a market segmentation of the monopoly market. If there were only 
one quality available, then the monopolist's demand function would imply a linear 
market demand curve where the fraction of consumers who are willing to buy a good of 
quality XM at any price PM would be equal to QM = 9 -6 . Assuming that the 
monopolist's unit production cost is CM , the monopolist in the market solves the 
following maximization problem with respect to price for a given quality. 
12 
(4) M a x n M - [ P M  C M ) Q M - [ P M  C M  )  
V J 
From the first order condition for this maximization problem, we know that 
Q j r  r  2  P  P "  
—— = 0 +1 h—— — < 0. If we have an interior solution such that > 9 the 
^ - JT* ^ ^ -
P 
market is uncovered. But in the case of a corner solution where —— = 0 the market is 
covered for a given quality. For the corner solution, it is necessary that 
# + l + -^-2<9<0 o 
In this covered-market case, the monopolist's price is at the level at which the 
least  value consumer (0)  gives up al l  her  surplus to purchase the good (i .e . ,  P*M  -  0XM  ) .  
Thus, the monopolist's product market equilibrium profit is: 
(6) nu ~ i*„ ~ C-M 
In the special case of strictly convex variable costs in quality where CM  -X2 M  as used in 
this dissertation, for instance, the monopoly market will be covered if 6 > 1 + XM  . Then 
the corresponding product market equilibrium profit of the monopolist is 
2.2.2 Duopoly Market Equilibrium 
Now, consider the duopoly covered market equilibrium where duopoly firms 
13 
move simultaneously in the production stage with Bertrand competition.2 In this stage of 
the game, qualities are exogenous. The market segmentation for each type of a product 
is described in Figure 2.3. 
Demand for Demand for 
Low Quality High Quality 
Good (O,) Good (g,) 
x_ 
r r 1 K e  
0 0ol 0 0U 0 — 0+1 
Figure 2.3 Duopoly Covered-Market Segmentation 
Given the firms' quality levels, Xx and X2, and their prices, Px and P2, the 
p 
marginal consumer 0ol = — is indifferent between buying a low-quality good 1 and not 
P -P buying at all, and the marginal consumer 0n = — — is indifferent between buying a 
^2-^1 
low-quality good 1 and buying a high-quality good 2. Therefore, the demands for good 1 
and good 2 are, respectively, given by Qx -0n-0_ and Q2 - 0 - 0l2. 
The profit function of the low-quality firm is given by 
nx = (Px - C1 ) Qx = (Px - C, ) (0l2 - 0), and that of the high-quality firm is 
ni - (^2 _ Q ) Q2 = (P2 - C2 ) (0 +1 - 0X2 ), where C , ,  i  -  1, 2 denotes the unit production 
costs for each firm i. The first order conditions for interior solutions yield the following 
two best response functions: 
(7) = 
2 Under the covered-market configuration, total demand is not a function of prices, so demand 
functions cannot be inverted. For Cournot competition to be meaningful, the market should be 
uncovered by allowing some consumers not to buy differentiated goods (e.g., Motta (1993)). 
14 
(8) ^ +Q +(g + 1)(Z, -Zj) 
Note that, for both maximization problems, the second order sufficient conditions 
associated with a concave objective functions are satisfied. 
Using the best response functions (7) and (8), and denoting with a superscript 
the production stage equilibrium values, we find that when both firms are active in 
the market the equilibrium prices are: 
(9) + Q) + (1 - - %,)} 
(10) %' = 1{(C, + 2Q) + (2 + g)(- JT,)} 
The corresponding profits are: 
-(H) 
(12) n\ = 
c > - ^ + x - e  
2 C -C :  ' + 2 + g  
Of course, these solutions only apply when, in equilibrium, the market is in fact 
covered. Thus, to complete the solution, it remains to check the following two 
conditions. First, for exogenously given qualities, the necessary condition for both 
outputs to be positive in product market equilibrium as obtained from (11) and (12) is: 
(13) Q-C, ^ 
This condition ensures non-negative demands at the duopoly product market equilibrium 
(i.e., Q* =-j ——— + 1-6I1>0 and Q2' = —j ———— + 2 + 01 > 0 ). As illustrated 
15 
in Figure 2.4, the firm producing a low-quality good becomes a monopoly for extremely 
C —C high consumer heterogeneity (such that 9_ < — -2), whereas the firm producing a 
Z; - A", 
high-quality good becomes a monopoly for very low consumer heterogeneity (such that 
C -C i 6 > — +1 ). Thus, the above restriction (13) excludes these two extreme cases. 
-
Inferior quality 
preempts the market 
Duopoly Superior quality 
preempts the market 
-> 6 
Q-C, 
- 2  
Q-c, 
+ 1 
"Relative consumer heterogeneity" decreases 
• 
Figure 2.4 Post-innovative Market Structure with a Covered Market 
Second, for a market to be covered, we need to allow the consumer with the 
lowest marginal willingness-to-pay for quality (Û) to have non-negative surplus when 
she buys one unit of the low-quality product (i.e., 0 X x  -  P *  >  0 ). Thus, for the following 
parameter restriction, each consumer buys one of the two varieties in non-cooperative 
equilibrium. 
(14) e >  (2C,+C,) + (Z,-%,) 
2Z, + Z, 
3 Heterogeneity, measured here by the ratio 0 Id, decreases with 0 (recall that 0 = d + \ y. the 
greater is 6, the more homogenous are consumers. Thus, the market is likely to be preempted 
by the low-quality firm when consumers are relatively heterogeneous, whereas the market is 
likely to be preempted by the high-quality firm when consumers are relatively homogenous. For 
the intuitive explanation, note that 0 is the marginal willingness-to-pay for quality. That is, a 
consumer with higher 6 is willing to pay more for the higher quality good, while a consumer 
whose taste parameter 0 is very low would not like to pay for the high quality good. Thus, the 
market will be preempted by the low-quality firm if 6 is very low. 
16 
In the essays of this dissertation, the duopoly product market equilibrium 
associated with the covered market configuration is applied for the special case of a 
quadratic variable cost function in quality, such that C, = X*. 
2.3 Comments on the Covered-Market Configuration 
Although suggested earlier by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979),4 in most VPD 
models, covering the market or not is not the strategic problem for firms. For example, 
as mentioned above, Ronnen (1991), Choi and Shin (1992), Motta (1993), Aoki and 
Prusa (1996), and Lehman-Grube (1997) used ex ante uncovered market configuration in 
the production stage of the game. However, their models exclude the possibility of 
covered outcomes or a corner solution in the production stage. On the other hand, in the 
VPD literature, ex ante covered market configuration about market outcomes is often 
used for its analytical convenience (e.g., Tirole (1988: 296-298), Rosenkranz (1995), and 
Pepall (1997)). The basic features of the model that we are using in this dissertation are 
also standard in VPD studies with the covered market configuration. 
The ex ante choice of using either a covered or an uncovered market 
configuration is clearly somewhat unsatisfactory. In this regard, Wauthy (1996) 
attempted a full characterization of quality choices without assuming ex ante that the 
market is, or is not, covered in the production stage of the game. To derive the two-firm 
market outcomes endogenously for the degree of product differentiation and the extent of 
consumer heterogeneity, we need to compare three types of market equilibrium values 
4 Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) showed that price competition could yield three price regions: 
duopoly uncovered-market outcomes where some consumers are allowed to not buying at all, 
duopoly covered-market outcomes where all consumers buy one of the two products, and the 
preempted market equilibrium. 
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using two different demand systems: (i) uncovered market equilibrium with uncovered 
P -P P - P -P 
market configuration where Q x  =  — L and Q 2 =  9  — , (ii) covered 
X2  — X {  X ]  X2  — X X  
market equilibrium associated with a corner solution under the uncovered market 
configuration, and (iii) covered market equilibrium with covered market configuration 
where Q, = — — 6 and Q2 = 0 —. 
V V — 1 V V A2 Si-1 vl. 2 
To avoid some of the analytic difficulties, however, we follow a number of 
previous analyses and assume ex ante that the market is characterized by a covered 
market configuration in the price game. Thus, the market equilibrium is defined only if 
we are in the covered market configuration where each consumer buys one of two goods 
offered. Again, this choice is motivated by a desire for which turns out to be critical if 
we want to keep the quality-choice problem (not yet discussed) tractable. 
One last thing to discuss concerns the assumption of a uniform distribution 
function for 6 . In an alternative approach proposed by Shaked & Sutton (1982, 1983), 
consumers differ by their incomes rather than by their tastes. That is, the condition 0> 0 
is equivalent to the condition that all consumers have a strictly positive income. 
However, our model yields similar qualitative properties to Shaked & Sutton (1982, 
1983) (see Tirole (1988)). For example, a higher 0 corresponds to a lower marginal 
utility of income and therefore higher income. Recognizing that 0 may have the same 
distribution as income, the uniform distribution assumption for 6 is somewhat at odds 
with the reality of income distribution. Following most other studies in this area, 
however, we maintain the uniform distribution assumption because of the powerful 
significations that it provides. 
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CHAPTER 3. VERTICAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION, 
ENTRY-DETERRENCE STRATEGIES, 
AND ENTRY QUALITIES 
3.1 Introduction 
The subject of 'vertical product differentiation' (VPD) in which consumers 
purchase at most one unit of the differentiated product has been applied extensively to 
explain the quality choice behavior of economic agents. To a degree, this is due to the 
convenient tools provided by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), 
Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983), and Tirole (1988: 296-298). In models of VPD, the 
product variants differ in their quality, and consumers differ in their willingness to pay 
for the quality. Although referred earlier by Bain (1956, Chapter 4) and discussed by 
Dixit (1979), the use of product differentiation advantages of incumbent firms as a 
source of the entry-deterrence strategy has not been broadly studied. Many models on 
strategic entry deterrence deal with "limit pricing" or "limit quantities",1 rather than 
"limit qualities", as the established firm's strategic tool to deter or accommodate entry. 
However, we recognize that, in reality, firms may compete in non-price aspects such as 
product differentiation.2 Thus, this paper is related to two branches of the literature: 
product differentiation and entry deterrence. 
Dixit (1979) provides an example for the role of product differentiation in 
strategic entry deterrence and suggests two opposing entry conditions: a greater absolute 
1 In the model of limit quantities or limit pricing, a quantity-leader can maintain a single-supplier 
position by expanding output to the level at which a rival prefers to stay out of the market. But, 
this is different from monopoly position because the quantity-leader cannot charge the monopoly 
price without inducing entry, unless the entry cost is very large relative to the market. 
2 By observing lack of noticeable entry of new firms over a long period in the ready-to-eat 
breakfast cereal industry, Schmalensee (1978) recognized that the quality choice can be used to 
deter rival's entry by providing substitutes to the product of the potential entrant. 
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advantage in demand for the established firm makes entry harder, whereas a lower cross-
price effect with the potential entrant's product leads to easier entry. However, in his 
representative-consumer model where a consumer's utility is a function of all the 
differentiated goods, only the degree of product differentiation matters, and no one good 
is superior to the others. Some researches introduced horizontal product differentiation 
to model variant choice of the firm facing new product entry. For example, Bonnano 
(1987) showed that the incumbent may use a location choice (or a product specification) 
in order to deter entry. Anderson and Engers (2001) also introduced horizontal product 
differentiation with time in the model, to determine the number of firms and the pattern 
of firm locations. 
In contrast to the formulation of Dixit (1979), Hung and Schmitt (1988, 1992) 
and Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995) used a Shaked and Sutton (1982)-type VPD 
model where goods can be directly ranked by qualities, to examine how the incumbent's 
choice of product quality depends on the size of the entrant's setup costs. The original 
VPD model of Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that how quality differences relax price 
competition. In their model, each firm decides simultaneously its quality level in the 
stage before price competition: one firm selects the maximum product quality and the 
other chooses the minimum quality to lessen price competition in the last stage of the 
game, in the absence of entry threat. Although entry deterrence can only be temporary, 
Hung and Schmitt (1988, 1992) altered this framework by introducing sequential entry 
and subsequent threat of entry. Thus, they showed that the threat of entry induces the 
incumbent firm (or the first mover) to provide a lower product quality than the 
technological maximum quality. Also, with the threat of entry, they showed that quality 
differentiation in duopoly equilibrium is reduced. 
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The idea of "limit quality", the minimum quality of the incumbent which deters 
entry, is clearly suggested by Donnenfeld and Weber (1995). They investigated how 
product competition among duopoly incumbents (instead of a single incumbent) and a 
potential entrant's fixed entry cost affect the entry-deterrence strategies and product 
qualities. 3 Their result shows that rivalry among incumbents associated with 
simultaneous quality choice results in excessive entry deterrence while the incumbents 
are likely to accommodate entry if they collude.4 In particular, they confirmed the result 
of Shaked and Sutton (1982) under the assumption of sufficiently high fixed entry costs, 
in that entry is blockaded and incumbents choose maximally differentiated product 
qualities to reduce price competition. For low enough fixed entry costs, they showed that 
entry is accommodated and incumbents will produce extreme qualities to reduce price 
competition by differentiating their product than that of the entrant. In this case, the 
entrant chooses a quality in the middle. Finally, when fixed entry costs are moderate 
entry is deterred by producing less differentiated "limit qualities" which lead to intense 
price competition among incumbents as well as a potential entrant and low profits. 
However, Shaked and Sutton (1982) - type VPD models are based on the 
assumption that there are fixed costs of quality improvement. Under this assumption, the 
marginal cost of quality itself varies, but the marginal cost of production (or the variable 
cost) does not change with product qualities. The results from Hung and Schmitt (1988, 
1992) and Donnenfeld and Weber (1995) are also limited to the case of quality-
independent costs. Thus, while these can reflect the situation where firms should engage 
3 A similar analysis associated with two incumbents who face a threat of potential entry was 
presented in Donnenfeld and Weber (1992), in the case of free entry where both variable and 
fixed costs for improving qualities are zero. 
4 Peitz (2002) also introduced two incumbents and a single potential entrant in the model, as in 
Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995) but with sequential quality choice of the incumbents, to 
show that higher entry costs make competition intensely as incumbents deter entry. 
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in R&D or advertising activities to improve qualities, these cannot reflect the variable-
cost aspects of quality improvement where the higher quality good is more expensive to 
manufacture due to, for instance, requirements of more skilled labor or more expensive 
raw materials and inputs. 
The fact that these results obtained may not be robust to different cost 
specifications has been suggested by Lutz (1996). By introducing "fixed" setup costs 
and "fixed" quality-dependent costs in which raising quality results primarily in an 
increase in fixed costs, Lutz (1996) explains how the entry-deterrence behavior of the 
incumbent depends on the combination of fixed costs and market sizes. Although Lutz 
(1996) suggested the possibility of various quality-cost specifications in the entry-
deterrence model of VPD, still the result is based on the high-quality advantage as in 
Hung and Schmitt (1988, 1992) and Donnenfeld and Weber (1995).5 Meanwhile, 
recently, Bergemann and Vâlimâki (2002) used the entry game with vertical product 
differentiation and uncertain demand to investigate optimal entry strategies when the 
quality of new variety is uncertain and is generated through purchases in the market. 
However, their research focuses only on the entry strategies without analyzing explicit 
entry-deterrence strategies. 
In the product differentiation model, consumer taste is the most important 
dimension of the model as demands are classified according to it. However, the 
literature discussed earlier does not consider directly consumer taste factors to explain 
5 Under the VPD structure with quality-dependent production cost (which is "variable"), the 
"high-quality advantage" (where the firm choosing to produce the high-quality good earns higher 
profits in equilibrium than does the low-quality firm) need not hold anymore. Note that Choi and 
Shin (1992), Tirole (1988), Aoki and Prusa (1996), and Lehmann-Grabe (1997) support the high-
quality advantage by assuming quality-independent production cost structure, while Lambertini 
(1996) suggests that the high-quality advantage with sequential or simultaneous quality choice 
does not necessarily hold under the assumption of quality-dependent production cost. 
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quality choice behavior facing entry. The properties of the socially optimal qualities in 
the presence of entry issues are also not clear. Importantly, whereas entry-deterrence 
strategies are discussed, the entrant's choice of quality levels on whether the entrant will 
choose an inferior quality or a superior quality relative to the existing variety is not 
highlighted. Thus, this study undertakes to fill these gaps by pursuing the following 
three issues. First, to investigate the incumbent monopolist's strategic entry deterrence 
by qualities in a VPD framework, we examine how the level of a fixed entry cost and the 
degree of consumer heterogeneity affect the incumbent's choice of product quality. 
Second, we suggest the reason why an innovative entrant chooses a superior or an 
inferior technology compared to the existing incumbent's variety. Thus, firms' choice 
whether to be the low-quality or the high-quality provider is endogenous. We relate this 
issue to the entry-deterring strategies of the incumbent firm. Third, we explore the 
welfare implications of entry. In particular, we ask how many varieties and what quality 
choice of entry are socially desirable, and whether entry deterrence is disadvantageous to 
the consumers, and evaluate market equilibrium values relative to socially optimal levels. 
Specifically, this study constructs a model of a vertically differentiated product 
market in which both prices and product qualities are endogenous, and entry is 
endogenous and sequential. We restrict our attention to entry-deterrence strategies with 
one incumbent-one potential entrant game. Based on a Mussa and Rosen (1978) type of 
VPD framework, we provide a three-stage game: the incumbent decides her product 
quality in stage 1 ; the potential entrant by observing the action taken by the incumbent 
decides whether to enter or not, and if she decides to enter what quality will produce in 
stage 2; both firms compete in prices in the last stage of the game if there is entry. Our 
model is different from conventional VPD set-ups in the following ways. First, we 
consider the sequential choice of qualities instead of a simultaneous choice. That is, the 
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incumbent firm can choose its product quality in advance of an entrant. Second, we 
accommodate quality-dependent marginal production cost, such that a higher quality is 
associated with a higher cost. Thus, unlike the assumption of Donnenfeld and Weber 
(1995) and Remark 1 in Hung and Schmitt (1988), where they assumed that the ranking 
of firms' profits is identical to the ranking of their qualities (i.e., a higher quality firm 
earns higher profits than does a lower quality firm), the "high-quality advantage" does 
not necessarily hold.6 In addition to the fact that no particular variety guarantees higher 
profits, under a quality-dependent marginal production cost, although firms want to 
differentiate products for strategic purpose (i.e., to soften price competition) they do not 
differentiate them completely but determine them in the interior of the feasible quality 
interval.7 Third, we suppose that the incumbent does not incur any entry cost, while the 
potential entrant must incur a fixed cost in order to enter. Therefore, entry occurs 
whenever strictly positive profits can be earned. Entry can only be deterred by strategic 
actions of the incumbent. In particular, the incumbent acts as a Stackelberg leader in 
determining its product quality level. 
The entry-deterrence strategies that we are using for the incumbent firm facing 
an entry threat are from the pioneer idea of Bain (1956) as used and stated in many 
studies (e.g., Dixit (1979), chapter 8 of Tirole (1988), and Donnenfeld and Weber (1995)). 
According to this convention, if the fixed entry cost is large enough, the entrant would 
stay out of the market even if the incumbent firm ignores the possibility of entry. We 
will call this case "blockaded entry". Under the blockaded entry regime, the incumbent 
monopolist does not modify its strategy and still can prevent entry. If entry is not 
6 Indeed, it seems that most quality standards in manufacturing affect variable rather than fixed 
costs. 
7 Maximal product differentiation holds under the covered-market and quality-independent 
marginal production cost (e.g., Tirole (1988) and Shaked and Sutton (1982)). 
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blockaded, the incumbent has to compare the benefit of entry prevention against the cost. 
According to this comparison, the incumbent may either deter or accommodate entry. In 
the case of a "deterred entry" strategy, the incumbent modifies its behavior by increasing 
or decreasing quality in order to deter entry, whereas in the case of an "accommodated 
entry" strategy, the incumbent chooses to allow entry. In our model, therefore, the 
solution of the "blockaded entry" is from the unconstrained monopolist's maximization 
problem, while the solution of the "deterred entry" strategy is from the constrained 
monopolist's maximization problem. The solution of the "accommodated entry" strategy 
is the Stackelberg's one. In particular, to determine the critical value of an entry cost 
between deterred entry and accommodated entry, we compare the incumbent's payoff 
associated with the deterred entry to the payoff associated with accommodated entry. 
We fully characterize how fixed entry costs and consumer heterogeneity affect 
the threshold conditions that describe the incumbent firm's entry-deterrence strategies 
(blockaded, deterred, and accommodated) and the entrant's quality choice. By 
introducing the quality-dependent variable costs in the model, we could entail the 
possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as the incumbent's entry-deterrence strategies 
by increasing its quality level towards a potential entry. 
First, when the entrant's fixed cost is sufficiently low, the entrant's choices are 
indifferent between entry with an inferior quality and entry with a superior quality, and 
the incumbent's optimal strategy is to accommodate entry. In this case, the incumbent 
selects a quality that is higher than the monopolist's choice. Second, if the entry cost is 
in a certain moderate range, the incumbent engages in entry deterrence by increasing her 
product quality before the entrant enters the market. Third, for a sufficiently high fixed 
entry cost, entry is efficiently blockaded and the incumbent chooses the monopolist's 
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quality level. Fourth, it is shown that while the consumer surplus is higher when the 
entry is accommodated than in the absence of entry, the maximum total welfare is not 
necessarily associated with the accommodated entry. In particular, the maximum welfare 
of the relatively homogenous consumers is attained at the fixed cost level, where entry is 
deterred. Fifth, for a certain level of fixed entry costs, there are too many varieties in the 
economy relative to the social optimum. We also show that Stackelberg firms associated 
with accommodated entry of a high quality strictly oversupply product qualities relative 
to the social optimum, while those associated with accommodated entry of a low quality 
strictly undersupply qualities. The incumbent monopolist, whether the entry is deterred 
or blockaded, strictly undersupplies the product quality relative to the social optimum. 
The remaining parts of this chapter proceed as follows. In section 3.2, we 
present the model and characterize product market equilibrium. In section 3.3, we 
analyze entry-deterrence strategies by examining quality-stage equilibria under the threat 
of entry. In particular, we compare two regimes of entry: entry with a superior quality, 
and entry with an inferior quality. In section 3.4, we investigate the welfare properties of 
entry deterrence and entry accommodation. In section 3.5, we provide summary and 
concluding remarks. 
3.2 The Model 
Our analysis focuses on the entry of an innovative firm into a monopoly market. 
Consumers are vertically differentiated according to product qualities. Initially, there is a 
single established firm in an industry, the incumbent labeled T, who serves the entire 
market. A single potential entrant labeled 'E' enters the market if entry results in positive 
payoff, and stays out otherwise. The incumbent has a "product differentiation advantage" 
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relative to the entrant: whereas the entrant incurs a fixed entry cost to enter the 
differentiated product market, the incumbent can change its product quality without 
incurring fixed costs. We can justify this assumption by noting that only the entrant 
needs entry costs for collecting target-market information, advertising a new product, and 
investing in new transportation channels; thus, the entry cost is invariant with respect to 
eventual quality levels. 
The sequence of moves has three periods. In period 1, the incumbent I selects 
its product quality X,. In period 2, the potential entrant E decides to enter the market or 
not, with product quality XE after observing X,. Because entry incurs a fixed cost, a 
potential entrant decides to enter only if profits exceed the entry cost. If an entrant enters 
the market with the same quality as the existing variety, undifferentiated Bertrand 
competition eliminates all profits; therefore, we will consider only the differentiated 
entry, where XE # X}. In the last period (i.e., in the post-entry market), the firms 
compete in prices (if the prospective entrant enters) given qualities.8 If the entrant stays 
out of the market, the incumbent plays as monopoly. In the case where there is entry into 
the product market, the equilibrium concept that we employ is subgame perfection with 
Bertrand competition at the third stage of the game. Thus, the game is solved backwards. 
3.2.1 Costs and Demand Structure 
We modify the monopolist's quality-choice model proposed by Mussa and 
Rosen (1978) into the duopoly model associated with an entry game. First of all, in the 
8 The two-stage structure such that firms choose qualities "simultaneously" and compete with 
prices at the last stage of the game has been used broadly since Shaked and Sutton (1982), to 
capture the idea that prices can be adjusted easily, costlessly, or in the short run, but product 
qualities cannot be changed as easily as price choice due to need for the modification of the 
appropriate "production facilities". Our 3-stage structure involving sequential moves in the 
quality decision makes possible for the first mover (i.e., the incumbent) to deter entry by an 
appropriate quality choice. 
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second period of the game, we suppose that the quality follower (a potential entrant) is 
free to choose any quality level by incurring a sunk and deterministic entry cost F > 0 ,9 
That is, an entry cost is invariant with respect to eventual quality levels. As noted earlier, 
in our model, the quality leader (the incumbent) has a cost advantage relative to the 
entrant (the quality follower) in that it does not need to incur any fixed cost to determine 
its product quality. 
Upon entrance of the new firm, the resulting duopoly supplies vertically 
dif f e rentiated varieties with one-dimensional qualities X. e (0, oo), i- 1, 2, with larger 
values of X t  corresponding to the higher quality ( X 2  >  X l  > 0 ). To avoid the 
uninteresting equilibrium in which only the highest possible quality, yet cheapest product 
is produced, we postulate a quality-dependent constant marginal production cost, such 
that the higher quality good is more expensive to manufacture. Specifically, we assume 
that both firms employ the same technology where costs of producing Qt units of quality 
X ,  are: 
(1) C(Z,,&) = %,=&, 
where is the quantity produced by a firm i. Note that this variable costs are strictly 
convex in quality, such that C"(A',) > 0 and C(X\) > 0 hold, but for given quality we 
have a constant unit production cost. This specification of VPD where firms compete in 
prices and incur variable costs of quality is compatible with some earlier models, such as 
Mussa and Rosen (1978), Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Motta (1993), and Bonanno 
9 Of course, with free entry ( F = 0 ), the game degenerates to a pure Stackelberg model. 
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and Haworth (1998).10 When fixed costs are either absent or quality-independent, in our 
model, convexity in quality of the variable cost function insures interior solutions in the 
quality-choosing stage of the game. 
On the demand side of the market, a continuum of potential consumers is 
differentiated by the non-negative, one-dimensional taste parameter 6. The parameter 0 
is assumed to be distributed uniformly with density 8 >0 over an interval [6>, 6 ] ,  with 
0 > 0 > 0 ." We normalize the indices as 5 -1 and 0 -<9 = 1. When entry takes place, 
we have a situation with two goods differentiated by a quality index Xt e (0, oo) , 
1 -1,2, that is observable to all. It is assumed that, as proposed by Mussa and Rosen 
(1978), the indirect utility function of a consumer 0 patronizing good i is: 
(2) = 
where Pi and Xt for z'= {1, 2} are, respectively, the price and quality variables. Thus, 
consumers have identical preferences but differ in their taste parameter G. Consumer 6 
is willing to pay up to 0Xi dollars for one unit of the product i. Hence his or her 
surplus is expressed as V i  =  6 X t  -  P t . In this setting, the consumer buys the good that 
provides highest surplus or buys nothing if Vt < 0 for two goods. 
10 With two-stage quality-price or quality-quantity choice VPD models, Bonanno and Haworth 
(1998) introduced a quality-dependent linear form of marginal cost; Mussa and Rosen (1978) and 
Part III of Motta (1993) used quality-dependent quadratic forms of marginal cost. Thus, in this 
case, the quality-dependent marginal cost enters directly into the competitor's pricing strategy. 
Importantly, although they did not explicitly indicate it, the "high-quality advantage" does not 
necessarily hold with the quality-dependent variable cost specifications. 
11 In an alternative approach proposed by Shaked & Sutton (1982, 1983), consumers differ by 
their incomes rather than by their tastes. That is, £ > 0 is equivalent to the condition that all 
consumers have a strictly positive income. However, our model yields similar qualitative 
properties to Shaked & Sutton (1982, 1983) (see, for example, Tirole (1988)). Say, a higher 0 
corresponds to a lower marginal utility of income and therefore a higher income. 
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Three market outcomes arise from this type of demand structure. First is the 
case of a partially covered market. Because a consumer buys if and only if his or her net 
p 
surplus V i  =  0 X i  -  P t  is positive, the marginal consumer 6 m  = — is indifferent between 
x\ 
buying a low-quality good 1 and not buying at all. Then consumers located at the low 
p -p 
end where 0 < 0m do not buy either good. By denoting as 9n - — — the marginal 
^2-^1 
consumer who is indifferent between buying good 1 and buying good 2, consumers 
between 6>01 and 6n buy the low-quality good, while consumers with 0 > 6vl buy the 
high-quality good.12 Therefore, when the market is not covered, the demands for good 1 
and good 2 are, respectively, given by O ,  = 6 X 2  - 0 m  and Q 2 - 0  - 9 U .  Second is the case 
where a market is fully covered at the market equilibrium. For a market to be covered, 
the least value consumer for quality should have non-negative surplus by purchasing the 
(low-quality) good. That is, we need a parameter restriction Ô > 0M for this type of a 
market configuration. Third, both covered and uncovered market configurations have the 
possibility of the preempted market. If there does not exist sufficient heterogeneity 
among consumers, then only the firm offering the lowest quality good or the firm 
offering the highest quality good may get a positive market share at the market 
equilibrium. In other words, there may be a case where an inferior quality covers all the 
product market while a superior quality is unmarketable, or vice versa. 
In this paper, we focus only on the covered market where all consumers 
p urchase positive quantities of the good. Then, for given prices (Pp P2), the covered 
market demand systems incorporating the possibility of the preempted market case are: 
12 We follow the convention that a consumer indifferent between two products ( <9 = 0n~) is 
assumed to choose the product of higher quality. 
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(3) Qx = max jo, minj#, <912}-<9j 
Gz=max{0, ^-max%, g}|, where ^ ^ 
Therefore, covered-market equilibrium can be characterized by the cases in which only 
the high-quality good is sold, only the low-quality good is sold, or both types of goods 
are present in the market. In particular, for the cases where both goods are present, the 
aggregate demand functions reflect a net substitution pattern (i.e., the cross price effect is 
positive). In the analysis that follows, given qualities Xx and X2, we focus on interior 
solutions in which both goods are consumed in the market and all consumers are served 
in equilibrium. That is, covering the market or not is not the strategic problem of firms 
in our model.13 Thus, the market equilibrium that follows applies to the parameter space 
where each consumer buys one of the two goods offered. 
Figure 3.1 Duopoly Covered-Market Segmentation (1) 
13 Wauthy (1996) provides a full characterization of quality choices when the covered or 
uncovered nature of the market is determined endogenously. To gain analytical convenience, 
however, the covered market assumption is often invoked (e.g., Tirole (1988: 296-298), 
Rosenkranz (1995), and Pepall (1997)). 
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The duopoly covered-market segmentation for each type of product is described 
in Figure 3.1. The consumer surplus for each type of product is on the vertical axis. The 
slope of the line is the quality level of each product. Note that if there is an increase of 
product quality, the market interval for that good is enlarged while the market interval for 
its neighbor product shrinks. 
Thus, when consumers differ in their taste 0 , the duopoly demand functions are 
defined by the following equations: 
(4) q^s^-  f (ey ie = s{F(6„)-F(e)}  
Q ^ s ^ f ( e y e ^ s { F { ë ) ~ F { e l l ) )  
where /(•) is the probability density function of 6 and F(*) is the corresponding 
cumulative density function. Assuming uniform distribution of consumers, / (0) = ^, 
and normalizing indices as 8 = 1 and 6 -& = 1, we have demand functions: 
(4)' 
where, again, Qn = ———. 
X 2 - X i  
3.2.2 Product Market Equilibrium 
3.2.2.1 Monopoly Market Equilibrium 
In what follows, we characterize the product market equilibrium. Consider first 
the monopoly market equilibrium. If entry does not occur, the incumbent is a monopoly. 
Recall that our scenario is starting from a single established firm who, initially, may or 
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may not serve the entire market. Because consumers are passive about the market 
coverage, a monopolist determines endogenously a covered or uncovered market. Thus, 
to invoke the assumption of full market coverage, we need to find the parameter 
restriction where the monopolist would cover the market. 
Demand for Monopoly 
Good (g*,) 
0 a # 
Figure 3.2 Monopoly Market Segmentation 
P Let us denote 0 = —^- (with a subscript 'IM' standing for the "incumbent 
monopoly") as the marginal consumer who is indifferent between buying a good and not 
buying at all. Figure 3.2 describes a market segmentation of the monopoly market. If 
there were only one quality available, then the monopolist's demand function would 
imply a linear market demand curve where the fraction of consumers who are willing to 
buy a good of quality X I M  at any price P 1 U  would be equal to Q M  - 6  - 6 .  Using the 
monopolist's unit cost X 2 I M ,  the incumbent as a monopolist in the market solves the 
following maximization problem with respect to price for a given quality. 
( 5 )  M a x  7 i M -{P1M XIM^QIM -{P^F X/M) 
R 
- P X 6 - - M -
From the first order condition for this maximization problem, we know that 
DW 2 P P* 
—— = 0 + 1 + X I M  —  < 0. If we have an interior solution such that —— > 0  the 
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p 
market is uncovered. But in the case of a corner solution where /v/ = 0 the market is 
covered. For the corner solution, it is necessary that 
dn (6) <9 +1 + -20 <0 o 6 > \ + XM 
P<M -OX1M 
In this covered-market case, the monopolist's price is at the level at which the 
least value consumer ( 0 ) gives up all her surplus to purchase the good (i.e., 
P"m = 0X!M ). Thus, the monopolist's product market equilibrium profit is: 
(7) 
3.2.2.2 Duopoly Market Equilibrium 
Now, consider the duopoly covered market equilibrium where duopoly firms 
move simultaneously in the production stage with Bertrand competition.14 In this stage 
of the game, qualities are exogenous. The market segmentation for each type of a 
product is described in Figure 3.3. Given the firms' quality levels, Xx and X2, and their 
p 
prices, Px and P2, the marginal consumer 6>01 = —- is indifferent between buying a low-
P -P quality good 1 and not buying at all, and the marginal consumer 0n = — — is 
X 2 - X x  
indifferent between buying a low-quality good 1 and buying a high-quality good 2. 
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  d e m a n d s  f o r  g o o d  1  a n d  g o o d  2  a r e ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  g i v e n  b y  Q x  = 6 n - 6 _  
and Q 2  -  0  - 0 X 2 .  For market to be covered, it is necessary that 9 > G m .  
14 Under the covered-market configuration, total demand is not a function of prices, so demand 
functions cannot be inverted. For Cournot competition to be meaningful, the market should be 
uncovered by allowing some consumers not to buy differentiated goods (e.g., Motta (1993)). 
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Figure 3.3 Duopoly Covered-Market Segmentation (2) 
Then each firm maximizes its profit with respect to its own price for any given 
quality choice and an opponent firm's price. With unit costs, C, = Xt2, i = 1, 2, the 
profit function of the low-quality firm is given by 
4 - ^  
vx2-x, 
• e  , and that of the high-quality firm is 
0  +  1 - . The first order conditions for interior 
solutions yield the following two best response functions: 
(8) = a,# )=- z, )} 
(9) ^ = + X/ +(g + l)(^ - ^ ,)} 
Using the best response functions (8) and (9), and denoting with a superscript 
the production stage equilibrium values, we find that when both firms are active in 
the market the equilibrium prices are: 
(10) ^ = -{(2%,= + Z,') + (1 -0(Z, - %,)} 
(11) ^ =!{(%,= + 2Z,') + (2 + g)(Z, - %,)} 
Substituting these expressions into the profit functions yield the payoffs for the quality 
35 
game:15 
{(Xj+Xi) + ( l-g)} 
x , )  9 
y  \  { ~ ( X 1 +  X l ) + ( 2  +  0 ]  
* • )  9 
Of course, these solutions only apply when, in equilibrium, the market is in fact 
covered. Thus, to complete the solution, it remains to check the following two 
conditions. First, for exogenously given qualities, the necessary condition for both 
outputs to be positive in product market equilibrium as obtained from (12) and (13) is: 
(14) jr,+jr,-2<;g3jr,+Z2 + i 
This condition ensures non-negative demands at the duopoly product market equilibrium 
(i.e., Q" > 0 and Q* >0).  As il lustrated in Figure 3.4,  the firm producing a low-quali ty 
good would become a monopoly for extremely high consumer heterogeneity (such that 
0<Xl+X2-2), whereas the firm producing a high-quality good would become a 
monopoly for very low consumer heterogeneity (such that û>Xl + X2 + l ).16 Thus, the 
restriction in (14) excludes these two extreme cases. 
(12) 7tx — (X2 
(is)  
15 Note that n\ is the incumbent's payoff and n\ is the entrant's one when entry occurs with a 
superior-quality good compared to the incumbent's quality. If the entrant chooses an inferior 
quality then the entrant's payoff is n\ and the incumbent's payoff is tt* . 
16 Heterogeneity, measured here by the ratio 919_, decreases with 9 (recall that 9 = <9 +1): the 
greater is 9, the more homogenous are consumers. Thus, the market is likely to be preempted 
by the low-quality firm when consumers are relatively heterogeneous, whereas the market is 
likely to be preempted by the high-quality firm when consumers are relatively homogenous. For 
the intuitive explanation, note that 9 is the marginal willingness-to-pay for quality. That is, a 
consumer with higher 6 is willing to pay more for the higher quality good, while a consumer 
whose taste parameter Q is very low would not like to pay for the high quality good. Thus, the 
market will be preempted by the low-quality firm if 9 is very low. 
36 
Inferior quality 
preempts the market 
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preempts the market 
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'Relative consumer heterogeneity" decreases 
Figure 3.4 Post-innovative Market Structure with a Covered Market 
Second, for a market to be covered, it must be the case that the consumer with 
the lowest marginal willingness-to-pay for quality ( 6 ) has a non-negative surplus when 
she buys one unit of the low-quality product (i.e., 9 X x  -  P *  >0).  It  is  verified that  the 
following parameter restriction guarantees that each consumer buys one of the two 
varieties in the non-cooperative equilibrium: 
In this section, we solve the quality-stage of the game (period 1 and 2) for given 
Bertrand-competition solutions at the production stage. We endogenize the entrant's 
choice whether to be the low-quality or the high-quality provider, relative to the existing 
variety produced by the incumbent. This is a Stackelberg model of quality choices in 
which the leader is the incumbent firm (I) and the follower is the entrant firm (E). 
The resulting game has the structure of the two-stage tree with a continuum of 
branches shown in Figure 3.5. At the initial node, firm I chooses a branch (a quality 
(15) 
2%, + %, 
3.3 Quality-Choosing Equilibrium 
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level), and then firm E moves from there.17 Note that the entrant's payoff function is 
discontinuous because the choice of a high or low quality compared to the incumbent's 
one is endogenous. Likewise, the incumbent's payoff function is discontinuous, 
consisting of a segment where the incumbent provides low quality, she provides high 
quality, and she is a monopolist. Thus, for an analytical purpose, we separate the low-
quality segment and the high-quality segment, connected at X} - XE, to find the local 
maxima. Then we compare two local maxima to find a global maximum. 
Enter with 
Quality 
Figure 3.5 Quality-Choosing Game (when entry is accommodated) 
3.3.1 Best Response Function of the Entrant 
Consider first the case of entry with a superior quality. The entrant's reduced-
form payoff function from price competition in the production stage of the game is given 
by equation (13), and the incumbent's payoff is given by equation (12). In period 2, a 
firm E  (the Stackelberg follower) chooses X E  to maximize n E  ( X n X k  ) -  F  for given 
17 The subscript 'IS' and 'ES' stand for the "incumbent's Stackelberg value" and the "entrant's 
Stackelberg value", respectively. The superscript 'AEH' and 'AEL' stand for the "accommodated 
entry of a high-quality good" and the "accommodated entry of a low-quality good", respectively. 
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Xj. If firm E enters, its best response in terms of incumbent's quality is given by 
5 + 2 
- ILL + • ,18 Then the entrant's payoff conditional on choosing superior-quality 
3 3 
entry is given by: 
(16) * ï ( x „ F ) " ' E \ x „ Y + ^ y - -F = 
4rg+2-2jr/  
• F 
The potential entrant enters the market only if this leads to a strictly positive payoff, 
and this holds for: 
19 
(17) X j  <  X H  , where A H = l  + =- f-T 
v2y 
F 1/3 
We now consider the case of entry with an inferior quality. The entrant's payoff 
function from price competition in the third stage of the game is given by equation (12), 
and the incumbent's payoff is given by equation (13). In this case, if firm E enters, its 
best response in terms of incumbent's quality is given by XE = —- + 20 Then the 
entrant's payoff, conditional on choosing inferior-quality entry, is: 
18 Two best response functions, x E  = — + - + 2 and X E  = -X ,  +  (9  + 2), are derived from the 
first order condition, dn* E  (X  , ,X  E )  I  dX  E  =0 , of the entrant's maximization problem. However, 
XE = -Xj +(9 + 2) does not satisfy a duopoly output condition (14). Then the second order 
condition at the equilibrium requires ^ 71E ^(2 + g)} ^  ^ <£ + i. 
9 '2 
19 Actually, when profits are zero, the prospective entrant's choices are indifferent between entry 
and no entry. However, we follow the convention that the entrant enters the market only if she 
can make positive payoffs (e.g., Dixit, 1980). 
20 Two best response functions, X E  = — + and X E  =  -X ,  +  (9  -1), are derived from the 
first order condition, ôtte  (X , ,  X  E  )  /  dX E  = 0 ,  o f  t h e  e n t r a n t ' s  m a x i m i z a t i o n  p r o b l e m .  H o w e v e r ,  
XE = -X,+(9-1) does not satisfy a duopoly output condition (14). Then the second order 
condition at the equilibrium requires — = 2 +X,+2( \—^) }  ^  Q  ^  ^  
6%^ 9 '22 
(18) = + 
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Z, 0-1 
v 3 3 
-F = -
9 
1-0 + 2JT 
•F 
The potential entrant enters the market only if this leads to a positive payoff, and this 
holds for: 
0 - 1  (19) X, > XL , where XL = ~ ^  + -
2 
The 'best response function of the prospective entrant' (BRE) relevant to the 
quality game describes the strategy of the entrant firm as a function of the incumbent's 
strategy. Based on the above two conditional responses, we can characterize an actual 
BRE on the ranges of fixed costs. Let us define the critical value X, (0) = -=- + i such 
that the following equality is satisfied: n l E  [ x n F ^  =  n "  { x n F ^  . If X ,  <  X f  then there 
can be superior-quality entry because n "  >  n l E .  Likewise, if X s  > X }  then there can be 
inferior-quality entry because n L E  > n " .  Now, to define completely the BRE, let us 
check the ranges of fixed costs. If X L < X I <  X H  then the entrant's positive-profit 
conditions (17) and (19) are not binding. This is the case when F < —. Whereas, if 
18 
XH < X, < XL then equations (17) and (19) are binding conditions. This holds for 
1 1 F > —. For F = — and X, = X,, entry does not occur because entrant cannot make 
18 18 ; ; 
positive payoffs. Therefore, there is a discontinuity in the BRE, and we can define it on 
the ranges of fixed costs as: 
40 
For F > —, XE — 
18 
For F = —, XE = 
18 
No entry, if X, = X, 
,  É-1 
. 3 3 - ,  
V Q 1 1 1 @ 
where X ,  =  —  +  —  ,  / L  s  1  +  —  -
' 2 4 "  2  V2y 
F"\and A =^- + 
/gy/3 
J, F 
1/3 
Figure 3.6 shows BRE when the entrant's positive-payoff conditions (17) and 
(19) are not binding because fixed costs are small such that F < y^-. Note that, in the 
quality-choice games, payoffs are zero when qualities are identical (i.e., payoffs are zero 
on the 45° line). Hence the BRE is necessarily discontinuous. Conditional on choosing 
superior-quality entry, the best response of the entrant is a c  because n "  (X j , F ) >  0 if 
Xj <| + 1. Likewise, conditional on choosing inferior-quality entry, the best response 
of the entrant is elf because Tt'k (XnF) > 0 if ^ ^ — . Now, we know that 
S S 
1 . 
n\ (X j, F )=7t"  ( X j, F )  if X ,  =  X J  •  Therefore, the actual BRE when F  <  — is abef 
< 
with discontinuity at X ,  =  X , .  
The BRE when F = — is presented in Figure 3.7. In this case, BRE jumps 
18 
down at XI because the entrant's payoff nE = nE -O at this level of incumbent's 
quality. 
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45° line 
Xj — — H—-
Figure 3.6 The Best Response Function of the Entrant (when F < — ) 
,'45° line 
2 2 2 4 
Figure 3.7 The Best Response Function of the Entrant (when F = — ) 
18 
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The BRE associated with high fixed costs such that F > — is depicted in 
18 
Figure 3.8. In this case, the positive-payoff conditions (17) and (19) are binding. The 
location of XH and ÂL depends on the size of the entrant's fixed cost. In fact, the 
distance between XH and XL increases as F increases. The model thus allows the 
possibility of incumbent's strategic behavior. The quality leader (the incumbent), by 
choosing limit qualities at which the potential entrant prefers to stay out of the market, 
can deter entry. 
'45° line <9 + 2 
BR, 
Figure 3.8 The Best Response Function of the Entrant (when F > —) 
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3.3.2 Quality Leadership and Limit Qualities 
In this section, we analyze the strategic behavior of the incumbent at its quality-
stage of the game. We classify the outcomes of the incumbent's quality as means of 
limiting prospective entrant's choices. Due to discontinuity in the prospective entrant's 
best response function, it is the size of a fixed cost that determines whether or not an 
entry-deterrence strategy is preferred. 
3.3.2.1 Parameter Restrictions on Market Outcomes 
Prior to proceeding with the analysis, it is important to note that the analysis 
applies only to the range of the parameter 9 which ensures that the duopoly actually 
covers the market. Let us first confine our attention to the post-entry duopoly (say, the 
case of F < — ). When entry occurs with a superior quality, BRE is given by 
18 
XE = ~ • The incumbent's (i.e., Stackelberg leader's) quality choice is given 
( X 9 + 2 ^  
by solving d n ]  X n — -  +  —  \ l d X j -  0. Accordingly, the Stackelberg solution is 
v 3 3 ; 
characterized by Zj™ = = + 1, = = + - , ^ , and ^ = J-_f . ^ 
2 4 2 4 9 18 
order for the duopoly market to be fully covered at the Stackelberg equilibrium, one must 
check whether these solutions satisfy constraints (14) and (15). Straightforward 
calculation shows that when entry occurs with a superior quality the constraint 
[Ï9 9 > J— % 1.2583 must be satisfied for both qualities to be positive and the market to be 
covered at equilibrium.21 
21 The duopoly condition (14) is obvious because X,  +  X E -2<6<  X ,  +  X F +1 <=> 6-\<6<6 + 2-
The covered-market restriction (15) is #> (2^/ +xe ) + (^£ ^ ^2 > 19 ^ ^  > IÏ9 _ 
- 12 - \12 
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Next consider the case of entry with an inferior quality. In this case, BRE is 
X 0 — 1 given by XE = ^—. The incumbent's quality choice is then given by solving 
»( X 0 — 1^ dn\ X,,—- + —— /d X i  =  0 . Accordingly, the Stackelberg solution is characterized 
V 3 3 
by =  +  =  ^=^,aad  Again ,  in  order  for  the  
duopoly market to be covered in the Stackelberg equilibrium qualities, one must check 
whether these solutions satisfy constraints (14) and (15). Straightforward calculation 
shows that when entry occurs with an inferior quality the constraint 0 > % 0.95743 
must be satisfied for both qualities to be positive and the market to be covered at 
equilibrium.22 
Consider now the pure monopoly market equilibrium, where entry does not 
occur. Because consumers are passive about the market coverage, a monopolist could 
determine endogenously a covered or uncovered market without ex ante assumptions. 
Thus, for the specific market outcomes, we need to find the parameter restriction where 
the monopolist would cover or uncover the market. As we discussed earlier, maximizing 
equation (7) with respect to its quality level yields a pure monopoly solution under the 
0 » 02  
covered-market configuration: X'IM = = and n]M = . For this monopoly market to be 
covered, we need to check whether this solution satisfies the monopolist's covered-
market restriction (6). Straightforward calculation shows that the constraint 
0>1 + X]M O0>2 must be satisfied for monopolist's equilibrium to be covered fully 
in the market. Thus, for 0<2 , the uncovered monopoly maximizes 
22 The duopoly condition (14) is obvious because X E  +  X , -2<0<  X E  +  X,  +  \  <=> 0~2<O<O +  \  •  
The covered-market restriction (15) is q > +^i ) + (^i %E) ^ ^ y > [H. 
2^+%; -  12 -  \12 
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X j M  - { P I M  ~  X j M ) \  0  +  1- A X, with respect to P1U and Xm . Then the resulting 
.... . . „» 2(l + 0) t \ + 0 » 
equilibrium values are PIM =— —, X!M = —= , and nm = 
1 + 0' 
V 3 y 
In conclusion, our analysis (which is confined to the duopoly covered market 
case) pertains to markets with <9e 00 . Then, as illustrated in Figure 3.9, the 
incumbent's outcomes can be specified for two different levels of consumer 
heterogeneity. One is associated with the uncovered pure monopoly equilibrium where 
there are relatively heterogeneous consumers such that 0 e S2  . The other is 
associated with the covered pure monopoly equilibrium where there are relatively 
homogenous consumers such that 0 > 2 . 
Uncovered Monopoly ! Covered Monopoly 
Covered Duopoly with Inferior-Quality Entry 
Covered Duopoly with Superior-Quality Entry 
19 
112 
2 
_-VV_ 
0 
J 
Relatively Heterogeneous 
Consumers 
V 
Relatively Homogenous 
Consumers 
Figure 3.9 Equilibrium Market Segmentation 
3.3.2.2 Case 1: Low Fixed Costs and Accommodated Entry 
When the entry cost is sufficiently low such that F < — entry deterrence is not 
46 
possible, so that the solutions for the entry accommodation are Stackelberg duopoly 
equilibria. Note that if entry takes place, the duopoly firms' Stackelberg payoffs are the 
same regardless which of the two possible equilibria applies. Specifically, the entrant is 
indifferent between entry with an inferior quality and entry with a superior quality. That 
is, points 'b' and 'e' in Figure 3.6 are both Stackelberg equilibria. 
3.3.2.3 Case 2: High Fixed Costs and Blockaded Entry 
If F is so large that n" < 0 and nLE < 0, the entrant cannot cover a fixed cost. 
That is, entry does not occur if the quality leader chooses its quality level between XH 
and Al in Figure 3.8. Consider first the range of relatively homogenous consumers 
where 0 > 2 . When the entry cost is sufficiently large to satisfy the covered 
0  ^ 0 ^ 5  
monopolist's quality level X"m = ~ > Az/ , or equivalently F > 
2 
v3y 
: 0.13169 , the 
unconstrained monopoly optimum can be achieved. Thus, the entrant will not enter the 
market even when the incumbent plays its pure monopoly quality level. In this case, we 
say that the entry is "blockaded". 
r 119 Now, for the range of relatively heterogeneous consumers where 9 6 
' 1 2 '  2  
entry is blockaded if the uncovered monopolist's quality satisfies X*M = —~ > AH , or 
equivalently F > F where F = f~yj (4 + • 
3.3.2.4 Case 3: Moderate Fixed Costs and Deterred Entry 
f 2 Y If F falls below the boundary given by — « 0.13169 for 0 > 2 , or F for 
\3y 
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0. the fixed cost of entry is insufficient to deter entry when the incumbent 
produces the pure monopoly quality. Then the incumbent has two choices: she could 
expand its quality level above the unconstrained profit-maximizing level to deter entry; 
or she could invite entry by choosing its quality level at which point less than XH or 
greater than XL, so that entry occurs immediately and the entrant's quality level rises 
instantaneously to the duopoly level. To analyze the entry-deterrence strategy of the 
incumbent, we define XBt as the quality level that discourages entry, where the 
s u p e r s c r i p t  B  s t a n d s  f o r  " b a r r i e r " .  T h e n  X f  i s  g i v e n  b y  M a x  n E { X E ,  X f  )  -  F  =  0 .  
Thus, the incumbent can choose any quality levels in X f  e  [ X H ,  X L \  to deter entry. 
1 First, consider the case where F  = —. If entry is accommodated, X ,  — »  X 1  is 
the profit-maximizing level of quality, so that the maximum payoff that the incumbent 
can get from the accommodation of entry is Mm n] (X,,XE (X, )) = —. Assuming that 
the market is covered, the incumbent's profit associated with the deterred entry is 
,  z  „ a x  .  a 2  (20-l)(20 + l)  
n im [ X j  = X l ) ~  O X j -X ,  = .  Again, one must check whether this 
x 
' 16 
solution satisfies the monopolist's covered-market restriction (6). Straightforward 
calculation shows that the constraint 6> 1 + Xf <=>#>— must be satisfied for this 
2 
constrained monopolist's equilibrium to be covered fully in the market. Then we know 
that, when F = ^ , the incumbent finds it most profitable to deter entry if 
n * I M ( x f  =  X j ) >  lim n )  ( X t , X E  ( Ar; )). For 0 > —  where the constrained monopoly 
^ ' x^xi 2 
market is covered, we have: 
48 
(21) K = ^(X'=X,)- lim ,;(X„Xt(X,))^6 l4 1>0 
144 
Thus, entry is deterred by the incumbent. Now, for 0 e 19 5_ 
' 1 2 '  2  
, the uncovered 
monopolist's profit is n I M  ( x f  =  X ,  )  =  + 1  ~  X 7  f  =  + + ^  80 *at: 
(22) r = *-;((x,* = *,)-,«$^;(Z„Xs(X,))>0 
because the minimum nIM at the lower bound of 0 is greater than the payoff from the 
accommodation, n 1M Xf=X„g: 
2 1 
: 0.418 > 0.222» — . Thus, when F = —, 
9 18 
entry is deterred by the incumbent. 
Second, consider the case where F > — but the entry is not blockaded. 
18 
0 Assuming that the market is covered, because ——  - 0 -  2 X ] M  <  0 for all X ,  >  —  ,  
ox 1M 
Xf - AH would be the incumbent's choice when she decides to deter entry. Note that 
3 V 
this constrained monopoly choice requires a constraint 0 _ > \  +  X !  o 0 >  4- 2| —  |  F 3  
to cover the market.23 Now, we know that if entry occurs with a high quality, 
a^(x„x,(xj)  2 0 1 
- = —(4%, + 5 - 20)(-4X, +1 + 20) > 0 for all X, e = —, X, 
ax, gr ' ^ ^ 2 \ 
Thus, X, XH is the profit-maximizing level of quality if the entry is accommodated, 
23 The minimum d to cover the market is located between 4 -2f-Y F3 = 2 when i7 = f-j anc* 
4_2|  ^ 1^=2.5 when 1 3> 
2;  18 
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so that the maximum payoff that the incumbent can get from the accommodation of entry 
is lim ,T* (X,,XE (X7)) . Then the incumbent finds it most profitable to deter entry if 
Xj 
n*iM {x? = 4/ ) > Jim A (Xj,XE (Xj )) , or equivalently, 
(23) G = 35 — ÂH j + (2AH — 2 — (4ÂH + 5 — 20) > 0 
Because the inequality (23) holds,24 the incumbent will deter entry. 
Third, consider the case where 0 e M 5 i and F > — (but the 18 
entry is not blockaded). Then the uncovered monopoly maximizes 
r P ^ 0 + 1- with respect to P]M and XIM . Substituting the first 
zw y 
d n „  2 Pn 
order condition, -Z^L - û +1 - + X1M - 0, to make the object function in terms of a 
Xn 
x„ quality level yields nIhi (X/M ) = —^{0 +1 - X I M  ) . Now, because 
dn]M _ (S + 1-X / M)(# + 1-3X / M)  
ox 
< 0 for all X, G 1 + 6 , X, , Xf - Â,, would be 
IM 
the incumbent's choice when she decides to deter entry. Also, we already know that if 
8^(Xy,Xg(Xj) ^ 
entry occurs with a high quality, ->0 for all X; e =—, X, ax, 2 2 
Thus, Xj —> XH is the profit-maximizing level of quality when the entry is 
accommodated, so that the maximum payoff that the incumbent can get from the 
24 Mugging into G yields c = ^(324-99^-32^) + 243j^T-lL where 
A == |£j3 pi. The maximum possible A determined when p _ is 1. Thus, the first term of G 
i s  p o s i t i v e .  F o r  6  >  2 ,  t h e  s e c o n d  t e r m  o f  G  i s  n o n n e g a t i v e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  G  i s  p o s i t i v e  f o r  0  > 2 -
50 
accommodation of entry is J i m  n ]  ( X j ,  X E  ( X ,  )) . Then the incumbent finds it most 
profitable to deter entry if rc]M (xf - XH ) > lim n] (X,, XE (X, )), or equivalently, 
(24) J = ^ -^(g + l-^)' + (2^-2-g)(4^+5-2gy>0 
1 8T Note that because T > 0 at F = — and — > 0, the inequality (24) also holds. Thus, 
18 OF 
the incumbent will deter entry by choosing XH as its quality level.25 
3.3.3 Summary of Incumbent Strategies 
We now characterize incumbent's equilibrium qualities that arise in various 
entry-deterrence strategies faced with potential entry. Market equilibrium values for 
each entry-deterrence regime are summarized in Table 3-1. For entry costs such that 
F > —, entry is 'deterred' (DE) or 'blockaded' (BE) so that the potential entrant cannot 
18 
obtain a positive payoff. In this region of the entry cost, then the incumbent may modify 
its quality-choice behavior relative to the pure monopoly solution in order to prevent 
entry. The incumbent monopoly market is segmented as the following Figure 3.10. 
25 We assumed that the prospective entrant enters the market only if she can make strictly positive 
payoffs. If, instead, we were to use a non-negative profit criterion for entry, then we need to 
distinguish two main cases. When F = — the non-negative profit entry criterion yields multiple 
equilibria (for the incumbent's choice X)  =  X ,  it would be an equilibrium for the entrant to 
choose a quality level corresponding to either point b or point e in Figure 3.6, or decides not to 
enter the market). When F >  — ,  on the other hand, the non-negative profit entry criterion still 
yields the same unique Nash equilibrium associated with entry deterrence. For the incumbent's 
choice X, = XH the entrant is now indifferent between entering or not. But if the entrant does 
enter, then the incumbent has a profitable deviation (by slightly increasing its quality level from 
lfI ) and so that cannot be part of a Nash equilibrium. Hence the choice X, - XH would be part 
of a Nash equilibrium only if the entrant does stay out of the market. 
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Table 3-1. Comparison of Equilibrium Values of Entry-Deterrence Regimes 
Type of Entry Variables Uncovered Monopoly Covered Monopoly 
Blockaded 
Entry 
Conditions 
on (f, g) 
When F> F  and /H. < q < 2, 
V12 -
where fs/Al (4+gy 
Uu 
When 
and 0>2  
X ,  
1+0 
3 
0  
2 
P,  2(1+0' 
9 
g' 
2 
n. M f-T UJ 
Deterred 
Entry 
Conditions 
on  (F ,  0 )  
When l _ < F < p  for 0e [M  2 > 
18 - V12 ' 
Blds/l58s4"2(l) 
When _L < p  <  f  1 )  
18 l3j 
5 
and g> 4 - 2^0F 1  
x ,  
—f-cr-
P,  
2 
K,  0XH -
Conditions 
on (f, g) When /r = _L and flEcffd 18 V12 - 2 
When /r~_L and q  > 1 
18 - 2 
x l  
8  1 
2 + 4 
0  1 
2 4 
P,  (2g+l)(6g + 5) 
32 
0(20 + 1) 
4 
n ,  
(2g + l)(2g + 3)' 
256 
(2g + l)(22-l) 
16 
Accommodated 
Entry 
Conditions 
on  (F ,  0 )  When 0 < F < — and & > — 18 - V12 
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Figure 3.10 Monopoly Market Segmentation 
Whether to deter or accommodate entry depends on the magnitude of entry costs 
and on the consumer heterogeneity parameter 0 . First, if the entry cost is sufficiently 
high, the entrant will not enter even when the incumbent plays its pure monopoly quality 
level. That is, in this case, the incumbent firm blockades entry simply by choosing its 
pure monopolist's quality level. Second, for a certain moderate range of entry costs, 
however, the unconstrained monopoly optimum cannot be achieved because pure 
monopoly equilibrium level of quality is not adequate to deter entry. If the incumbent 
firm also cannot gain from the differentiated market, in this case, the incumbent engages 
in entry deterrence by increasing her product quality to prevent the prospective entrant 
from entering the market. Third, when the entry cost is sufficiently low such that 
F  < — ,  entry is accommodated and the incumbent selects a quality that is strictly higher 
18 
than the monopolist's choice. Note that if entry takes place, the entrant's Stackelberg 
profits are unchanged regardless of entry qualities.26 Thus, the entrant's choices are 
26 Note also that, there is a first-mover advantage associated with quality leadership: when entry 
is accommodated, the incumbent (the Stackelberg leader) is in a position to obtain more profits 
than the entrant (the Stackelberg follower) regardless of the entrant's quality superiority or 
inferiority (i.e., nl >ite)- In particular, the first-mover's equilibrium quality does not change 
whether the accommodated entry accompanies an inferior or a superior quality. Quality 
differences at either type of accommodated entry equilibrium are the same and equal 1/2. 
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indifferent between entry with an inferior quality and entry with a superior quality when 
entry is accommodated by the incumbent. The following Proposition 1 and Figure 3.11 
characterize the entrant's quality choice and the incumbent's deterrence strategies. 
Proposition 1. There exist cutoff levels of fixed entry costs and consumer heterogeneity 
such that (i) the entrant chooses either low-quality entry or high-quality entry, and the 
1  [ Ï 9  incumbent accommodates this if F < — and 0 > , I— ; (i) entry is deterred if 
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Figure 3.11 Zones of a Strategic Entry and Entry-Deterrence Decision 
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3.4 Welfare Analysis 
In this section, we consider the normative aspects of the entry problem that we 
have studied. First, we investigate how the market equilibrium level of consumer surplus 
and social welfare is affected by the changes in fixed entry costs. Second, we evaluate 
the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent in terms of social welfare criteria by 
solving the social planner's maximization problem. 
3.4.1 Consumer Surplus 
From the demand system, where potential entrant actually enters the market, we 
calculate the level of aggregate consumer surplus as the sum of the surplus of consumers 
who buy the low-quality good and that of those who buy the high-quality good:27 
In the absence of entry, consumer surplus associated with the incumbent monopolist's 
market is:28 
Substituting market equilibrium values of the quality in Table 3-1 into these 
definitions yields consumer surplus for each entry-deterrence regime: 
27 As mentioned, subscript 1 and 2 denote the incumbent firm and the entrant firm, respectively, 
when entry occurs with a superior quality. The opposite notation applies with the entry of an 
inferior-quality good. 
28 Regardless of whether entry is deterred or blockaded, the expression of aggregate consumer 
surplus is given by equation (26). 
(25) 
+ -^-(1 + 0) +^~^2(l + ^) 
^~{dxIM-PM)dd=± 2 1M ~P'M' for covered monopoly 
p2 
M 
, for uncovered monopoly 
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For covered monopoly, CS = 
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^ "-À 
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F1/3 and F = 
81 
(4 + g)=.  
Note that, whether the entry quality is superior or inferior compared to the incumbent's 
quality level, consumer surpluses from the high- and low-quality entry are both equal to 
36#:+36#-35 
144 
when the entry is accommodated. 
Figure 3.12 depicts how consumer surplus changes as the fixed entry cost 
changes. The response has three distinctive phases. First, when the fixed cost is so large 
that the entry is blockaded, the incumbent's quality choice and its price are not dependent 
on the magnitude of a fixed cost. Thus, the consumer surplus is constant in this region. 
Second, when the fixed entry cost decreases and so entry is not blockaded, the incumbent 
increases its quality level to deter entry as fixed costs decrease. In this case, the 
consumer surplus of the relatively homogenous group (leading to the covered monopoly 
case) increases as fixed costs decrease, while relatively heterogeneous consumers (the 
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uncovered monopoly case) become worse off. Third, when the fixed cost is so small that 
the incumbent cannot deter entry, the consumer surplus is independent on the level of a 
fixed cost because the entrant's positive-profit conditions which are depending on F are 
not binding. In particular, the consumer surplus from the accommodated entry is higher 
than that of the deterred entry and blockaded entry. The proposition below summarizes 
how consumer surplus varies across fixed costs. 
Proposition 2. (i) The consumer surplus for cases with relatively homogeneous 
consumers is non-increasing in the fixed costs. That is, both actual entry and the 
potential entry associated with the deterred entry, increase consumer surplus relative to 
the pure monopoly situation, (ii) For cases with relatively heterogeneous consumers, the 
consumer surplus from the accommodated entry is higher than that of the blockaded and 
deterred entry. The threat of entry associated with the deterred entry, however, makes 
consumers worse off. 
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Figure 3.12 Consumer Surplus 
3.4.2 Equilibrium Social Welfare 
In this section, we investigate how the equilibrium social welfare changes as the 
fixed entry cost decreases or increases. Combining measures of consumer surplus along 
with firm profits, in the case where the potential entrant actually enters the market, yields 
social welfare: 
^ ^ ^ (1 + 6)2 - g= +/; 6 -/>, (1 + 6) 
(28) 2(X2-X,)  2 2 
va "i  y v. " -2 "- i  j  Y  -  Y  
• ( p ' - x i ) \  \+e- 4-^ Y  —  Y  -F 
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In the absence of entry, social welfare is defined by: 
(29) 
2% IM 
+  ( P im - X ÎM) \  1 + £-
X„ 
for uncovered monopoly 
(1 + 20 ) X ! M  + - X j M ) ,  for covered monopoly 
Substituting market equilibrium values of the quality in Table 3-1 into these 
definitions yields social welfare for each entry-deterrence regime: 
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Figure 3.13 depicts how market equilibrium level of social welfare changes as 
the fixed entry cost changes. The total welfare of the accommodated entry depends on 
the fixed entry cost. As we can see, maximum welfare is not necessarily associated with 
the case of accommodated entry. Although it is deterred, potential entry may be welfare-
enhancing relative to the pure monopoly situation. Thus, the following proposition holds. 
Proposition 3. Entry deterrence is not necessarily welfare decreasing. For relatively 
homogeneous consumers, maximum welfare is attained at F = —, where entry is 
18 
deterred. For relatively heterogeneous consumers, maximum welfare is attained at 
F - 0, where entry is accommodated. 
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3.4.3 Social Optimum 
If the planner were to introduce a new variety, the planner determines the 
socially optimal level of qualities under marginal cost pricing. We suppose that the 
planner also needs a fixed entry cost to choose a new variety while she does not need it 
to choose existing variety. We assume that this fixed cost is same as the entry cost F . 
Thus, in the presence of entry, the planner maximizes the sum of profits and consumer 
surplus as:29 
r 
A2 A2 A j 
Solving the problem in (31) yields the efficient level of qualities as: Xx = •=• + - and 
2 8 
0 3 X2 - — + — .30 Note that, in our parameter ranges on 0 , the market will be fully covered 
2 8 
P X1 0 1 1 
with these optimal qualities because 0 > -4~ = -J- = X. = — + — e> 0> — . Meanwhile, 
- X, X, ' 2 8 " 4 
if the planner decides not to introduce a new variety in the economy, then the optimal 
quality is determined by solving the following maximization problem. 
(32) 
29 Note that the price level is not relevant in the planner's problem. It only can make a role in 
redistributing surplus between consumers and producers. 
30 Three candidate solution sets, JV = 2- + 1 r = 2- + 3l, {x. = 4~ + 1 X, = 4~ + 3l, and 
I '  4  =  4 j l '  8  '  8 j  
X. _~ 1 x.  = + H are derived from the first order condition of the planner's 
4 4 J 
maximization problem. However, only \ x =  ^ ~  +  *  X  = + 3 1 satisfies the second order 
! ' 8 ' ' 8 J 
condition at the equilibrium. 
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6 1 Straightforward calculation yields X = = + —. Note that, in our parameter ranges on 6 , 
P X2 6 1 1 
the market will be fully covered with X because 6> — = —=~ = X = — + — <=> 0> —. 
- X X  2  4  "  2  
If the planner accommodates a new variety in the economy, 
162=+169 + 5 
64 
• F . If only one variety is allowed in the economy, 
16g2+ 160 + 4 
64 
Thus, the planner accommodates a new variety in the w(x) 
economy if W> w(x), i.e., whenever t < -
64 
Now, let us compare the market equilibrium level of qualities to the socially 
optimal level of qualities. In the absence of entry, X ] M  = |  *  ^ ~  I <  0 1 -j 
2 4 
% for 
2 IM  
e , e l 
< I ! 
2 4 
v ^ "T/ 
/ rt 1 
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1- — 
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When entry is accommodated, therefore, profit maximization yields a quality difference 
that is too high, i.e., (X, -X,)-(X2* = . Then the following 
proposition summarizes these results. 
Proposition 4. (i) The level of entry costs that makes it socially optimal to have a new 
quality of good in the economy is F < —. Thus, for F e 
64 
1 1 
, there are too many 
.64 18, 
varieties in the economy relative to the social optimum, (ii) For a fixed entry cost with 
F  <  — S t a c k e l b e r g  f i r m s  p r o v i d e  e x c e s s i v e  p r o d u c t  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,  c o m p a r e d  t o  w h a t  
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would be socially desirable, (iii) The incumbent monopolist, whether the entry is deterred 
or blockaded, strictly undersupplies product quality relative to the social optimum. 
Note that the Stackelberg firms excessively differentiate product qualities to 
reduce price competition. In particular, for high-quality entry, the oversupply of product 
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qualities is associated with the overproduction of low-quality product; for low-quality 
entry, by contrast, the undersupply of product qualities is associated with the 
overproduction of a high-quality product. That is, from the planner's maximization 
problem, socially optimal demands are determined by Q x - 6 X 2 - 9 _ -  (X2 +  X l ) -  9  =  - j  
and Q 2 = l  +  0 - Ô X 2 = l  +  9 -  ( X 2  +  X x  ) = - - .  Meanwhile, the Stackelberg leader's (the 
incumbent's) market share is greater than the follower's (the entrant's) one regardless of 
#  p *  _ p *  2  
entry regime: for high-quality entry, equilibrium demands are Qx = —-, l— -0 = — 
^ 3 
f P — Pi P — P l 
and Q2* = 1 + 0 -, = - ; for low-quality entry, O " = — l— -9 = — and 
X2 — Xx 3 X2 — Xx 3 
P — P 2 Qj =1+5 h l— = — - Therefore,  for  high-quali ty entry,  there is  the oversupply of  
-Z, 3 
product qualities (  X ,  =  =  +  - < • = •  +  —  - X ,  and X 2  =  -  +  -  <  =  +  —  = X 7  )  
^ ' L2 8j 12 4j ' ' 12 8j 12 
associated with the overproduction of a low-quality good ( Qx <Q* ) and the 
underproduction of a high-quality good {Q2 >Q2). For low-quality entry, there is the 
undersupply of product qualities ( Xx = r# r n = + - > 
12 8, U 4 J 
= X, and 
X, 9 3 , - + - > 
2 8 
| + ^| = ^2 ) associated with the underproduction of a low-quality 
good ( Q x  >Qi ) and the overproduction of a high-quality good ( Q 2  <  Q *  ) .  
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3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
We have analyzed the strategic use of entry deterrence of an established firm, 
and the entrant's quality choice, in a vertically differentiated product market. We have 
characterized the equilibrium properties of the three-stage game in which quality choice 
is sequential, price competition occurs at the last stage, production costs are quality-
dependent, and a fixed entry cost is required to the potential entrant firm. With the 
simplest case of one incumbent firm facing one prospective entrant, we showed how the 
incumbent's pre-entry decision generates various equilibrium qualities. In our 
Stackelberg game, the incumbent influences the quality choice of the entrant by choosing 
its quality level before the entrant. This allows the incumbent to limit entrant's entry 
decision and quality levels. We characterized the levels of entrant's fixed costs, and the 
degree of consumer homogeneity, that induce the incumbent to engage, in equilibrium, in 
either entry deterrence or entry accommodation. Also, we compared market equilibrium 
values to the socially optimal ones. The main results are as follows. 
Consider first the incumbent's behavior. For sufficiently low fixed entry costs, 
entry is accommodated and the incumbent chooses a quality that is strictly greater than 
the monopolist's choice. For sufficiently high fixed entry cost, however, the incumbent 
does not gain from a differentiated duopoly market. Thus, in this case, it is never the 
case that entry is accommodated. The incumbent facing the potential entry of a 
competitor increases its quality relative to the pure monopoly level to deter entry. If the 
entry cost is very high the incumbent can blockade entry simply by choosing its pure 
monopoly quality level. 
Second, the entrant firm, when fixed entry costs are sufficiently low, is 
indifferent between entry with a superior-quality good and entry with an inferior-quality 
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good. However, if the entry cost is too high, it is better for the entrant to secure zero 
profit by staying out of the market. 
Third, on the welfare side, whether the entry occurs with a high-quality good or 
with a low-quality good, consumers' surpluses are the same. We find that consumer 
surplus of the relatively homogenous group is non-decreasing as fixed entry costs 
decrease. For relatively heterogeneous consumers, however, the threat of entry 
associated with the deterred entry makes consumers worse off as fixed costs decrease. In 
terms of society's welfare, although it is deterred, potential entry can be welfare-
enhancing relative to the pure monopoly situation. In particular, the maximum welfare 
of the relatively homogenous consumers is attained at the fixed cost level where entry is 
deterred. 
Fourth, we calculated the critical level of an entry cost that, below this level, the 
social planner would introduce a new quality of the good in the economy. It was shown 
that, for a region of the fixed entry cost, there are too many varieties in the market 
equilibrium relative to the social optimum. We also showed that Stackelberg firms 
associated with accommodated entry excessively differentiate product qualities to reduce 
price competition. It turns out that the incumbent monopolist strictly undersupplies the 
product quality relative to the social optimum. 
We stress that our analysis on how the existence of a potential entrant influences 
the quality in the Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) type of a VPD model is based on the 
assumption of quality-dependent variable costs. With this quality-cost specification, 
unlike Hung and Schmitt (1988, 1992) and Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995), the 
"high-quality advantage" (where the firm choosing to produce the high-quality good 
earns a higher profit in equilibrium than does the low-quality firm) does not necessarily 
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hold.31 Although Lutz (1996) recognized that the quality-dependent costs could change 
the results of Hung and Schmitt (1988, 1992) and Donnenfeld and Weber (1992, 1995), 
in his case, the costs are not variable but "fixed". Also, under our quality-dependent 
marginal production cost, firms do not differentiate products completely (unlike Tirole 
(1988) and Shaked and Sutton (1982)). By introducing the quality-dependent variable 
costs in the model, we allow for the possibility of inferior-quality entry. 
For future research, a few potential extensions of this study can be considered. 
First, the quality-setting model discussed in this chapter is essentially a static one-period 
game. In the real world, however, entry cannot occur instantaneously. It takes time to 
decide whether to enter, to expand facilities, and to reach long-run profits. Dynamic 
inferences may be worth exploring by analyzing repeated games. Second, to avoid some 
of the analytic difficulties, we followed a number of previous analyses and assumed ex 
ante that the market is characterized by a covered market configuration in the price game. 
Thus, the market equilibrium that we have studied applies only when we are in the 
covered market configuration where each consumer buys one of two goods offered. The 
model with partial market coverage, instead of full market coverage, may be more 
appealing because it allows for some potential consumers not to buy the differentiated 
goods. In another aspect of the model, the ex ante choice of using either a covered or an 
uncovered market configuration is clearly somewhat unsatisfactory.32 Third, we have 
calculated the socially optimal level of qualities. Then the next question is how to 
31 Actually, we have shown that the incumbent's profit is greater than the entrant's profit, 
regardless of entrant's quality regime (i.e., there is a first-mover advantage). 
32 As in Wauthy (1996), two-firm market outcomes (whether the market is covered or not) can be 
derived endogenously for the degree of product differentiation and the extent of consumer 
heterogeneity. In spite of attractive features of this, due to required characterization for both 
covered and uncovered market configuration, we cannot take anymore analytical simplicity of 
the covered market configuration. Beyond the difficulty of characterizing equilibrium values, 
also, endogenizing market outcomes seems to involve difficult problems of interpretation. 
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regulate differentiated firms to improve social welfare. The socially desirable 
intervention as regulatory remedies may involve the optimal subsidy/tax policies applied 
to product R&D investments, maximum price regulation, and the use of quality standards 
(e.g., Besanko, Donnenfeld, and White (1988), Ronnen (1991), Ecchia and Lambertini 
(1997), and Toshimitsu (2003)). 
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CHAPTER 4. INFERIOR-PRODUCT INNOVATIONS WITH 
EXTERNAL EFFECTS 
4.1 Introduction 
The motivation of this study comes from the recent introduction of 'genetically 
modified' (GM) agricultural products, where the issues of segregation between GM and 
conventional goods are controversial and have given rise to a number of unresolved 
economic questions. We view GM and non-GM goods as vertically differentiated 
products in terms of consumers' preferences. Although this type of product 
differentiation might be a polar case, in the sense that all potential buyers evaluate 
quality in the same way, it provides the analytical convenience. We relate the market for 
GM products to the apparent gap of the 'vertical product differentiation' (VPD) literature, 
where previous studies do not consider explicitly the possibility of the introduction of an 
"inferior product". We aim at analyzing the specific question of how private decisions 
by an innovator bring forth inferior or superior technologies, in a situation where 
consumers would be willing to pay a higher price for the information that a product is or 
is not genetically modified. Thus, the key factor playing a role in this analysis is the cost 
of segregation activities that are necessary to distinguish GM products from non-GM 
products. 
4.1.1 An Example from the Agricultural GM Products 
After the introduction of GM plants in the mid-1990s, there has been an intense 
debate focused largely on the relative benefits and risks of GM products.1 Due to their 
contribution to the reduction of production costs and improved pest control for farmers, 
1 Related general economic issues are well constructed by Nelson ed. (2001), Harhoff, Régibeau, 
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herbicide-tolerant and insect-resistant genetically engineered crops (such as cotton, corn, 
and soybeans) have been cultivated increasingly in the United States and in a few other 
exporting countries.2 However, there appears to be strong consumer resistance to these 
products, especially in the European Union, Japan and other importing countries. A 
resistance is rooted in concerns about the safety of GM products with respect to human 
health and the environment.3 Thus, it seems that the GM technology can be viewed as a 
process innovation from a farmer's point of view, and a product innovation from a 
consumer's point of view (i.e., the new product is an imperfect substitute for an existing 
product). More importantly, it also seems that a fundamental feature of current GM 
products is to introduce to market new products that are not universally accepted as 
superior (Lapan and Moschini, 2004). Indeed, there is no reason, a priori, to believe that 
the current GM technology increases each individual's incentive to consume if the 
resulting product is viewed by consumers as inferior to the old variety. The rise of GM 
labeling regulation, in the European Union for example, may justify this concern. 
However, even if the GM technology may yield inferior products, if consumers have a 
lower marginal valuation of quality, an inferior technology may dominate the market 
(e.g., Sallstrom (1999)). The important and critical point, in this setting, is the fact that 
and Rockett (2001), Moschini (2001), and USDA (2001). 
2 During 6 years (1995-2001), the global area dedicated to genetically modified crops increased 
more than 30 times: in 1996, only 1.7 million hectares of genetically modified crops were planted 
in 6 countries such as the United States, Canada, and Argentina; by the end of 2001, the total area 
growing genetically modified crops increased to 52.6 million hectares and the number of 
countries growing these crops has more than doubled (Nap et. al (2003)). 
3 Ex ante regulations such as mandatory labeling and premarket approval for all foods obtained 
from GM products have been introduced in Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. The EU countries 
require that all foods containing more than 0.9% 'genetically modified organisms' (GMOs) must 
be labeled as "containing GMOs". Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Korea have introduced or 
drafted labeling requirements, and other countries are considering to require GM labeling. But 
the United States only has a voluntarily labeling system (for more details, see USDA (2001) and 
Zarrilli (2000)). An additional important factor, in this setting, may be represented by concerns 
about the industry concentration in the seed industry (Harhoff, Régibeau, and Rockett (2001)). 
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keeping old and new products separated by 'identity preservation' (IP) may be very 
costly,4 so that the market outcome may lead to inefficiency (Lapan and Moschini, 2004). 
Producers of high-quality products would generally like to be known as such 
because consumers are willing to pay more for higher quality. Thus, innovators that 
develop a superior product will make an effort to supply information with their new 
variety. In other words, in a product innovation in which the new product is ranked 
higher than the old product by every consumer, the cost of implementing an IP system 
can be expected to be internalized by the innovator. However, if there is a negative 
consumer reaction to a new product, innovators may have little incentive to pay for IP 
costs because disclosure of information about the new variety may not be beneficial to 
them. For example, disclosure of information by innovators may be beneficial to their 
potential competitors (such as GM-free producers). Thus, if consumers' right-to-know 
imposes a mandatory IP system, and as long as GM innovators are not responsible for the 
external costs incurred by the new technology, producers and/or consumers of GM-free 
product are expected to pay IP costs. In this case, there will be a negative price 
externality in a differentiated product market of GM and non-GM products. Recognizing 
that the Pareto criterion requires the absence of externalities, if innovators do not 
internalize such external costs, it seems that there may be an inefficient level and/or type 
of R&D investment from a society's point of view. The relevant point, in this case, is 
how much of R&D investment level is socially desirable, given the added costs involved 
with implementing IP system. 
4 This is usually because it is necessary to keep conventional products segregated from the new 
variety of GMOs throughout the production and marketing system via storage, transportation, 
processing, and distribution (Bullock and Desquilbet, 2002). 
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4.1.2 VPD Models 
Mussa and Rosen (1978)-type or a Tirole's (1988) simplified version of Shaked 
and Sutton (1982, 1983) VPD models have been extensively used to investigate the 
firm's R&D behavior of quality choices in the context of a non-cooperative two-stage 
game of identical duopolists, where each firm is allowed to offer only one quality, and 
where investments in quality are made simultaneously in the first stage and then product 
market competition occurs in the second stage. Most models with heterogeneous 
consumer preferences use a linear indirect utility function for each type of consumer and 
a uniform distribution on consumer's tastes to obtain an explicit solution of the game, 
with attention restricted to the case of an uncovered market (e.g., Ronnen (1991), Choi 
and Shin (1992), Motta (1993), Aoki and Prusa (1996), Lehman-Grube (1997), Bonanno 
and Haworth (1998), and Greenstein & Ramey (1998)) and covered market (e.g., Tirole 
(1988: 296-298), Rosenkranz (1995), and Pepall (1997)).5 However, as summarized in 
Table 4-1, the representation of the firms' marginal production costs is different 
depending on the purpose of the study. Very simple quality-choice models are 
established in the absence of production costs, and by assuming that the quality choice is 
costless (e.g., Tirole (1988) and Choi and Shin (1992)). In the model of Mussa and 
Rosen (1978) and Bonanno and Haworth (1998), to avoid equilibria in which only the 
maximal quality, yet the cheapest product is produced, a quality-dependent constant 
marginal production cost is introduced, such that the higher quality good is assumed to 
be more expensive to manufacture. Meanwhile, conventionally it is assumed that the 
R&D costs to bring about product innovation are sunk, convex, and strictly increasing in 
the quality level. 
5 Wauthy (1996) provided a full characterization of quality choice, without imposing the ex ante 
restriction that the market is, or is not, covered in the second stage of the game. 
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Table 4-1. Assumptions on the Nature of Costs in VPD Models 
Types Variable Costs Fixed R&D Costs 
Type I: 
Tirole (1988) 
Choi & Shin (1992) 
Quality-independent Quality choice is 
costless 
Type II: 
Mussa & Rosen (1978) 
Champsaur & Rochet (1989) 
Part III of Motta (1993) 
Crampes and Hollander (1995) 
Bonanno & Haworth (1998) 
Quality-dependent: 
Marginal cost is an increasing 
function of quality 
R&D cost is a constant 
or zero. 
Type III: 
Ronnen (1991) 
Part II of Motta (1993) 
Lehmann-Grube (1997) 
Toshimitsu (2003) 
Quality-independent Convex R&D costs: 
Firm should engage in 
R&D to improve quality 
These different quality-cost structures in a duopoly VPD model produced 
following two important results. First is the "maximal product differentiation" result that 
attains under the covered market setting. In a very simple quality-choice game model, 
Tirole (1988) by using the modified version of Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed that 
firms maximize product differentiation over the available range of qualities. Even 
though the model displays the absence of quality-choice costs, because price competition 
is more intensified the less differentiated are the goods, price competition gives firms the 
incentive to differentiate their products. Thus, the optimal solution for the first stage 
problem is the maximal product differentiation where one firm chooses the minimum 
possible quality and the other firm chooses the maximum possible quality. The second 
result is the "high-quality advantage" where the firm choosing to produce the high-
quality good earns a higher profit in equilibrium than does the low-quality firm. For 
example, Tirole (1988), Choi and Shin (1992), Aoki and Prusa (1996), and Lehmann-
Grube (1997) support the high-quality advantage result by assuming that the cost of 
quality choice (the R&D cost) is zero, or is born as a fixed cost in the first-stage quality 
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choice while variable production costs are insubstantial. 
4.1.3 Our Entry Model 
In the existing literature of VPD models, it is uncommon to find studies that 
recognize the introduction of an "inferior product" as defined in Sallstrom (1999).6 In 
most previous studies, R&D expenditure allows a firm to produce only a new good 
where quality has been improved. But if the market consists of sufficiently many 
consumers whose quality preference is low, then a firm may want to serve more 
consumers by the introduction of a low quality good associated with a low price in the 
market Examples of such lower-quality innovations may be found in the furniture 
industry, in the production of musical instruments, and in the food industry. Thus, it 
would seem restrictive to presume that a firm will carry out only a superior innovation 
that improves on the quality of an existing variety. In our model, we do not designate a 
priori the type of quality (high or low) for each firm unlike conventional duopoly models 
in which a firm designated as a "low type" is not allowed to choose a "high type" of 
product in the model, and vice versa. Thereby, in our model, whether the entrant firm 
chooses an inferior or a superior technology is determined endogenously. 
Regarding our entry model, it should be noted that the two results associated 
with the conventional VPD models (i.e., maximal product differentiation and high-
quality advantage) are not robust when the marginal cost of production varies with 
qualities. Under the VPD structure with a quality-dependent production cost, as noted by 
6 In a model with variable cost of quality and heterogeneous consumers, Sallstrom (1999) 
showed that there is a possibility of quality-reduced innovation in the market equilibrium when 
new technology makes larger scale production feasible. This is due to the fact that consumers 
who were not buying the good will start buying it after cost reduction and so quantity increasing 
technological change. Then the new optimal quality may fall if the new consumers have low 
marginal valuation for quality. 
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Lambertini (1996), the high-quality advantage with a sequential or simultaneous quality 
choice does not necessarily hold. Also, with this cost specification, equilibrium qualities 
can be determined internally within the feasible quality interval (rather than being 
differentiated maximally). Thus, in our entry model, we accommodate a quality-
dependent marginal production cost in which higher-quality entry is associated with 
higher costs. Indeed, it seems that most quality standards in manufacturing high-quality 
goods may affect variable rather than fixed costs. As a result, we can avoid the 
uninteresting equilibrium in which only the highest quality entry is chosen (i.e., the 
entrant may not earn higher profits by providing a superior quality relative to the existing 
variety). 
In this study we ignore the possibility of drastic innovations. In a vertically 
differentiated product market with sufficiently wide consumer preferences, a firm never 
becomes a monopolist. We also consider a situation where an inferior good, although it 
can be produced cheaply, yields a negative externality to the producers of a superior 
good because it introduces the need for segregation costs. On the other hand, an entrant 
firm wanting to produce a new good superior to the existing one will have to internalize 
this external cost to produce a superior good. Thus, by developing a game-theoretic 
model of R&D entry, we examine how this segregation externality affects the incentives 
of the entrant to innovate. Also, we investigate the biases on private sector R&D and on 
the direction of research because of the existence of these IP costs, when an innovating 
firm does (or does not) internalize the externality costs brought about by the new product. 
Finally, we explore the welfare properties of market equilibria. In particular, we 
investigate how consumers are affected by the existence of externality in identity 
preservation costs. 
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In the model that follows, quality and externality parameters determine prices 
directly through variable costs. We show that the potential entrant firm may enter the 
market with a low-quality good for the high enough values of externality parameters, and 
vice versa. Our model takes this effect into account and characterizes the impact of 
externality parameters on the consumer welfare. 
The remaining parts of this chapter are organized as follows. First, we specify 
the game-theoretic model of market entry. Second, we characterize the market 
equilibrium level of product innovation, and its properties with respect to interesting 
parameters. Third, we evaluate the market equilibrium in terms of consumers' welfare. 
4.2 The Model 
Our analysis focuses on the entry of a single biotechnology firm into a 
monopoly market. Initially, the firm decides whether to invest to create a new GM 
product in the market where consumers differ in their willingness to pay for different 
observed qualities. As a simplification, it is assumed that the magnitude of the R&D 
investment is fixed and the innovation arises with certainty if the investment is made. 
Once an irreversible investment is made, we consider a two-stage game of the market for 
a product with heterogeneous qualities. Anticipating the product market equilibrium 
values, in the first stage (the development stage) the biotechnology firm chooses its entry 
quality; in their second stage (the production stage) both the incumbent and the entrant 
compete in a product market. Thus, profit maximization in the first stage does not 
involve strategic interactions among firms, whereas it does in the second stage. We 
assume that firms constitute a Bertrand price-setting duopoly in the second stage of the 
game. Thus, we consider only the case where the potential entrant would choose a 
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"high-" or "low-" quality good compared to the existing variety. This is because duopoly 
price competition in a homogeneous good market drives firms' profits to zero; hence the 
entrant is better off by differentiating its entry product from the existing variety. 
4.2.1 Demand 
The demand side of the market is characterized by a continuum of potential 
buyers differentiated by non-negative, one-dimensional taste parameter 6 . The 
parameter 0 is assumed to be distributed uniformly with density 5 > 0 over an interval 
[ 0 ,  0 ] , with 0  >  0 >  0. For simplicity, we normalize the indices as S  = 1 and 0 - 0 - 1 .  
Initially, it is assumed that each consumer demanded one unit of a good indexed by 0. 
Introducing a new good indexed by 1 in the market via successful innovation, two goods 
defined as labels 0 and 1 are vertically differentiated. Assuming the market is fully 
covered,7 each type of consumer (0) demands either one unit of good 0 or one unit of 
good 1, and has tastes for the exogenously given one-dimensional quality index 
X g (0, oo) that is observable to all, where a higher value of X corresponds to a higher 
level of quality. It is assumed that, as proposed by Mussa and Rosen (1978), the indirect 
utility function of a consumer 6 patronizing good i is: 
(1) = 
where Pt and Xt for i = {(), 1} are, respectively, the price and quality variables. 
This utility function implies that all consumers prefer higher quality if the two 
qualities are offered at the same prices, but they differ in their willingness to pay: 
7 A duopoly market is said to be "covered" if all consumers purchase one unit of either good. In 
an uncovered market setting, by contrast, some consumers are allowed not to purchase at all. We 
focus on the covered market case purely for analytical convenience. 
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consumer 0  is willing to pay up to 0 X t  dollars for one unit of the product i  ; hence his 
or her surplus is expressed as Ui - 6X: -Pi. It is assumed that consumers are price and 
quality takers: given firms' decisions (Xj,Pi), / = {0, 1}, each consumer has to choose 
between purchasing one unit from the incumbent or purchasing one unit from the entrant. 
These decisions are based on the 'individual rationality constraint' (IRC) and the 'self-
selection constraint' (SSC).8 Therefore, given the available choice set of quality and 
price, the market is partitioned in a straightforward manner: a consumer will buy one unit 
of a product if surplus is non-negative (by IRC) and greater than the surplus from 
consuming the other product (by SSC). 
Let X l  =  k X 0 , where k  >  0 , and normalize X Q  =  \ .  Then, the parameter k  is 
the relative quality chosen by the entrant firm, k - 1 corresponds to the homogenous 
product case, whereas values of k other than 1, VA e (0, oo) describe cases in which 
goods are imperfect substitutes. We will say that the innovation of good 1 is "inferior" if 
k < 1, and "superior" if k > 1. We denote kL as an inferior technology and kH as a 
superior technology. Then, for given prices, (Pv P0), aggregating individual demand 
behavior into product demand functions for good 1 and good 0 yields: 
(2) & = 
a = 
max jo, 0  -max{<910, #}}, i f k <  1  
m a x  jo,  m i n j # ,  < 9 0 1 ] - 6 ? j ,  i f k > \  
max jo, min\ 0 ,  i f k <  1  
max jO, (9-max{6>up #}}, if k > 1 
8 No consumer chooses a good whose price is too high or whose quality is too low. That is, if 
1] > P(} and X0>Xl, all consumers prefer good 0. Likewise, if J\ < P0 and X0 < X] , all 
consumers prefer good 1. Thus, the assumption of SSC implies that P x  > P0  if X0  < X }  and 
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where <910 = 1 and 00] = 
k H  - 1  
In what follows, we will restrict our attention to the "non-drastic" innovation where the 
innovation cannot drive the existing variety out of the market, and both firms compete in 
the post-innovation market.9 
4.2.2 Costs and Firm Behavior 
In the supply side of a market there is an incumbent firm producing good 0 and 
a prospective innovator that would enter the market with new good 1 via product 
innovation. The incumbent is initially endowed with a constant marginal production cost 
C0 > 0 while an entrant is not initially in the market. To avoid the uninteresting 
equilibrium in which only the highest possible quality is chosen by the entrant, we 
postulate a quality-dependent constant marginal production cost for the entrant, such that 
the higher quality good is more expensive to manufacture. Specifically, our assumption 
is that if the entrant chooses quality k  then its unit production cost is C, = c ( k ) , where 
c ' { k )  >  0,  c " ( k ) >  0, and c(l) = C0 for all feasible relative qualities k  e (0, oo). This 
variable quality cost assumption implies that product innovation accompanies a cost-
reducing or cost-increasing effect. Thus, low-quality entry will have a "cost advantage", 
while high-quality entry will have a "quality advantage" at the expense of high 
production costs. In particular, when the following fixed R&D costs and segregation 
externality parameters are absent, convexity in quality of the variable cost function 
ensures profit maximizers in the quality-choosing stage of the entrant. 
9 In the literature, "drastic" and "non-drastic" innovations are typically defined when the 
innovation is cost-reducing: a process innovation is drastic if the cost reduction enables the 
innovator to charge the monopoly price, whereas it is non-drastic if the innovator gains some cost 
advantage over its rivals but not one such that the firm can price like a monopoly without fear of 
competition (Tirole, 1988: 391-392). 
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We now suppose that a potential entrant is free to choose any quality k e (0, oo) 
by incurring a constant fixed R&D cost. There is no competition in R&D investment. A 
R&D decision is a "yes" or "no" decision, and investment yields a successful innovation. 
A potential entrant's decision to enter the market will be determined by the last stage 
payoff. Once an innovative firm chooses to enter the market, R&D costs no longer 
influence optimal decision-making. Also, in stage two, the previously-made R&D 
expenses have become sunk costs that do not directly affect the profit-maximizing output 
choice. Thus, without much loss of generality, we suppose that R&D costs are equal to 
zero. 
In addition to these assumptions on costs, we make an additional assumption 
regarding the implementation of segregation between old and new goods. Given our 
VPD structure, an effective segregation system will generate a price premium for 
superior products whenever there are consumers who prefer them. Thus, after the 
innovation, it is the producer of the superior product that needs to incur a "segregation" 
cost to prevent co-mingling between superior and inferior products. Specifically, the 
assumption is that, if the entrant prefers to choose a level of quality that is below the 
level of the incumbent's quality X0, then it induces external segregation costs for the 
incumbent firm in the amount of y L a  ( k L  )  Q 0 , where y L >  0,  < r ( k L ) >  0, and a  ( k L )  < 0 . 
On the other hand, if the entrant prefers to choose a level of quality that is above X0 
then it will be the party that has to incur the segregation cost y H < j { k n ) 0 { , where y H  >  0,  
a ( k H )  > 0 , and a ' ( k H ) >  0 . Note that we are allowing for possibly asymmetric 
segregation costs (i.e., yL * yH ). The parameter yJt j = L, H, relates to the efficiency 
of the segregation process (e.g., higher ys implies that segregation is more expensive or 
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is less effective; and yj = 0 means the absence of segregation costs). Then the second-
stage total costs can be specified as follows: 
(3) rc 
iCoGo, zft>l 
In addition to the accommodation of asymmetric segregation costs, our 
formulation of segregation costs is intended to capture two different types of externality. 
Q u a l i t y - i n d e p e n d e n t  s e g r e g a t i o n  c o s t s  a r e  c a p t u r e d  b y  t h e  f u n c t i o n  a [ k ^  =  \ ,  j  - L ,  H  .  
On the other hand, if < j ' { k L ) <  0 or c r ' ( k H )  >  0 the segregation costs are positively 
related to the quality differences. Economically, this cost specification may be used to 
characterize the market for GM agricultural products, which provide the potential for a 
differentiated marketing system and give rise to the controversial issues of segregation 
between GM and non-GM goods. Modern genetic engineering techniques allow 
scientists to manipulate genetic materials and to produce new varieties of plants and 
animals more quickly and easily than conventional breeding methods. To date, the first-
generation biotechnology in agriculture has mainly provided agronomic benefits to 
producers, typically, by lowering input requirements and/or increasing yields (Nelson ed., 
2001). The low-quality entry in our model, in particular, involves cost-reducing 
technology which does not directly affect yields (e.g., herbicide-tolerant corn and 
soybeans reduce herbicide use in the process of production). However, the controversial 
consumer responses for the safety and benefits associated with the use of first-generation 
GM products may make this biotechnology as an inferior one relative to the conventional 
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variety in the product market. Genetic modification could also be used to benefit 
consumers directly. Indeed, second-generation GM products such as high-oil corn and 
rice with enhanced Vitamin A content are considered as a quality-enhanced technological 
change associated with positive consumer attributes.10 The segregation and identity 
preservation between GM and non-GM products yields various costs, for farmers for 
example, during planting, harvesting, storage, transportation, and testing (Bullock and 
Desquilbet, 2002). Our imposition of segregation costs for the identity-preserved 
superior products is based on the presumption that the perfect segregation is possible.11 
4.2.3 Product Market Equilibrium 
We now focus on the Nash equilibrium of the post-innovation second stage of 
the game in which both firms are active. Because demand functions cannot be inverted 
by the assumption of covered market, for the equilibrium profits in the production stage, 
we assume Bertrand competition.12 In this price subgame, entry quality is exogenous 
and in equilibrium the two firms will set prices such that the price of a higher-quality 
good is greater than that of a lower-quality good, because, otherwise, the low-quality 
firm would have no market share. The incumbent's second stage problem is to choose 
the profit-maximizing price for its product conditional on a given price chosen by its 
rival firm: 
10 See Nelson ed. (2001) for various examples of GM products. 
11 Technically, it is known that it is very hard to keep perfectly conventional products segregated 
from the new variety of GM products, as there is a possibility of contamination throughout the 
production and marketing system via storage, transportation, processing, and distribution 
(Bullock and Desquilbet, 2002). Thus, the product differentiation model involving quality 
uncertainty in the presence of imperfect grading and contamination problem of the GM 
agricultural product market can be an additional research agenda. 
12 For Cournot competition to be considered, we need to assume that the market is uncovered by 
allowing some consumers not to buy the differentiated goods (e.g., Motta (1993)). 
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(4) Max 7r0 = 
fi) (given fj) 
{^ o ~ c 0 ~ r L c r ( h ) }  
z  p  ~ p ^  \ + o 0 1 
l -& 
•L J 
(^,-Q) 
\ k H  
,  i f  k < \  
The first order condition for an interior solution yields the following best response 
function: 
(5) 
~ { P \ +  +  { I  - k L ) { \  +  f f )  +  y L a ( k L ) ^ ,  i f  k <  1  
~{P\+Ca-{kH -1)0}, i f k >  1  
Likewise, the entrant's second stage problem is: 
(6) Max nx = 
p, 
(given P0) 
f  p  - P  x  
{^-c(W-r*cr(W} 1  +  6 -
k H  - I  j  
i f  k > \  
The first order condition for an interior solution yields the following best response 
function: 
(7) 
!{%+c(tJ-(i- t jg},  #<i 
^-{^+c(^)+(^-i)(i+g)+^o-(^)},  ^t>i 
Let the Bertrand Nash equilibrium prices be denoted by P^ and ff , and their 
corresponding quantities Q*} and Q*v . Solving simultaneously the two best response 
functions yields Bertrand Nash equilibrium prices and output levels, which are: 
P~A) 
(8) p; 
MC 
MQ + 
"{At, i f k <  1 
+ ( 2  +  5 ) } »  i f k > \  
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(9) Pn = 
MC[ + + (2 + g)}, ifk< 1 
, if k > 1 
(io) a' 
1{A1 + (1-S)}, i f k <  1 
j-AH+(2 + 0)},  i f k > \  
(11) So* 
-{-A7+(2 + 0)},  z/£<l 
K+(i-g)},  ^*>i 
where M^=C„+^o-(tJ , AfCj=c(*J , MC°=C„ , M7^=c(^) + y^cr(^) , 
A, = 5 and A „  = —MÇj l  Note that when k ,  =  k H  =  1 , we have 1-*, -1 
Bertrand's model of price competition with an undifferentiated product in which 
equilibrium prices are the marginal cost of production. As noted earlier, thus, we 
consider only the case of strictly differentiated entry because the potential entrant can be 
better off (rather than have zero profits) by differentiating its entry product from the 
existing variety. 
The corresponding equilibrium profits are: 
(l~*x)(ôi) = ^ g +(1-0)} , i f k <  1  
(^~l)(ôi)  —"{-A# +(2 + 0)} ,  i f k > \  
(l -*x)(Ôo) = ^ 9  L \-^l  +(2 + 0)} ,  i f k < \  
(^h - l)(ôo) —"{A#+(l-0)} ,  i f k >  1 
(12) U i — 
(13) fin — 
To complete the duopoly covered-market solution, it remains to check the following two 
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conditions. First, for exogenously given qualities, the necessary conditions for both 
outputs to be positive in the product market equilibrium (i.e., Qf * > 0 and Q* >0) are: 
2,  A z+1),  i f  k  < \  
2, A f f+l),  i f k >  1 
Second, for a market to be covered, it must be the case that the consumer with the lowest 
marginal willingness-to-pay for quality (0) has a non-negative surplus when she buys 
one unit of the low-quality product. It is verified that the following parameter restriction 
guarantees that each consumer buys one of the two varieties in the market equilibrium: 
(15) " " 
- ° - 2 + *^ 
4.3 Market Equilibrium Levels of Product Innovation 
4.3.1 Entry Qualities 
In this section, we solve the first stage of the game, where the innovative 
monopolist undertakes product innovation. The innovative entrant's payoff relevant for 
characterizing the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the first stage consists of the 
reduced form of profits from the second stage less the fixed innovation cost, i.e., 
nf =  n \  -0 associated with k  < 1 and II f = n \  -0 associated with k  > 1. Then the 
equilibrium levels of product innovation k  * ,  j  - L ,  H  are implicitly defined by the 
following first order conditions: 
(16) = + + = 0 l) 
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(17) g) = g + 2 + A*(t/)-2{c'(t/) + r*<T'(t/)} = 0 ^r^e(l, co) 
The sufficient conditions c " { k L  ^ - y L < y " [ k L  j >  —  
f A A ^ 
> 0 for an inferior innovation 9 , 
and + > 0 for a superior innovation insure that k* and 
kH* are unique profit maximizers in their respective domains (see the Appendix). That is, 
for k *, j = L, H, implied by equations (16) and (17) to be profit maximizing, the 
sufficient condition requires that the cost differences between two firms are convex. 
As noted earlier, the high-quality advantage does not necessarily hold with the 
specification of the quality-dependent marginal production cost. That is, as we will show 
later with specific examples, the entry quality is not predetermined as the higher one. 
The entrant has two local maxima, for the low- and high-quality segment, respectively. 
For the inferior-quality entry, Elf attains a local maximum at k*, where - 0, and 
the value kL* is characterized by the FOC (16). For the superior-quality entry, f] 
d U H  
attains a second local maximum at k H *  , where — = 0 , and the value k H *  is 
characterized by the FOC (17). To determine how the direction of entrant's quality 
c h o i c e  a n d  t h e  l e v e l  o f  q u a l i t y  a r e  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  c h a n g e s  i n  p a r a m e t e r  v a l u e s  o f  y L ,  y H  ,  
and 0 , consider the value function V defined as the difference between two local 
maximum profits, or 
Then the function V incorporates entrant's optimal quality-choice behavior. That is, the 
entiy quality will be "high" relative to the existing variety if V > 0 , "low" if V < 0, and 
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"indifferent" between low-quality and high-quality regime if V = 0 . 
4.3.2 Comparative Static Analysis 
The incentive to provide qualities is related to the parameter values of y L ,  y H ,  
and 9 . We are now interested in the derivatives of the value function V , namely the 
effects on the "direction of quality choices" in these parameters. Using the chain rule of 
differentiation with respect to the parameter yL, we have: 
The first term on the right-hand side of (19) is equal to zero by the application of the 
Envelope Theorem. Thus, there remains only the direct effect on the direction of an 
entrant's quality choice from changing yL : 
(19) 
Likewise, 
dv _ snf _ 2<y(fc/)  | AH  ( k H  ) - 2 - 0 j < 0 
(21) 
{ k f i  ~  l)  { k H  )  +  2 +  +  ( l  -  )  | a£  { k L  )  +1 -  >0 ùfg gg 9  L 
The inequalities above arise from the necessary conditions (14) for post-innovative 
d u o p o l y  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  U n a m b i g u o u s l y ,  a n  i n c r e a s e  i n  y } ,  j  - L ,  H ,  d e c r e a s e s  V  ,  
and an increase in 0 increases V for all 6 in the appropriate interval. Thus, the entrant 
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earns higher profits as a low-quality innovator for high enough Y. and/or low enough 9 . 
Conversely, the entrant earns higher profits as a high-quality innovator for low enough 
Yj and/or high enough 9 . Thus, we can summarize the results above as follows: 
Result 1. 
(a) When segregation is sufficiently costly, entry will occur with a low-quality good 
relative to the existing variety. 
(b) When consumers are sufficiently wealthy entry will occur with a high-quality good 
relative to the existing variety. 
The economic intuition behind Result 1 is clear. First, because the increase in 
y j raises a unit cost and lowers the demand faced by the high-quality producer, the shift 
of consumers from high- to low-quality products raises the profits of the low-quality 
producer. Second, because 6 is the consumers' marginal willingness-to-pay, a consumer 
with higher 9 is willing to pay more for the higher quality good, while a consumer 
whose taste parameter 9 is very low would not like to pay for the high-quality good. In 
the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1982), the parameter 0 can be interpreted as the 
marginal rate of substitution between income and quality, so that a higher 9 corresponds 
to a lower marginal utility of income and therefore a higher income. That is, wealthier 
consumers have a higher value of 9 and are willing to pay for a higher quality good. 
Under this interpretation, the entrant is more likely to enter the market with a high-
dV quality good when consumers are wealthy, or vice versa, because > 0 . 
Conditional on the chosen quality direction, let us now examine the effects of 
externality parameters and the degree of consumer heterogeneity13 on the level of entry 
13 Note that consumers' heterogeneity, measured by the ratio 9/Û, decreases with d (recall that 
6 =0 + 1): the greater is 0, the more homogenous are consumers. 
qualities. Totally differentiating equation (16) and (17) for yL, yH , and 0 , we obtain the 
effects of segregation efficiency and the degree of consumer heterogeneity on the entry 
quality of the biotechnology firm. The comparative static results can be obtained by the 
Implicit Function Theorem and by virtue of the second-order conditions as follows: 
(22) 
(23) 
(24) 
(25) 
f  
sign 
sign 
sign 
sign 
9% 
• sign 
. ag , 
= sign 
d L ( k L ' ; y L , & )  ^  
+ 2(7'(t/) 
>o 
. ^ v 
a# 
= sign 
• sign 
a # g )  <r(V)  ^ 
>o 
These results indicate that entry quality levels are positively related to the level of 
consumer homogeneity (Figure 4.1), while the signs of comparative static results for the 
externality parameters depend on the type of segregation costs. When <j(kj) is a 
constant (for example, <j(kj) = 1 ), entry quality levels are positively related to the 
segregation inefficiency parameters (Figure 4.2). Figure 4.3, by contrast, illustrates the 
case <7(kj) - |l - k}. j, such that cr'(kL ) < 0 and <j'(kH ) > 0. 
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Figure 4.1 Comparative Static Analysis of 9 
H i  0  <  y j  <  y "  »  j - L ,  H  
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Figure 4.2 Comparative Static Analysis of Yj •' Case of cr'ik^ = 0 
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n /  0 < Y j  < y " ,  j  =  L ,  H  
0 V(r«) k  l 
Figure 4.3 Comparative Static Analysis of y} : Case of - |l - kj | 
4.3.3 Examples 
To derive simple reduced-form solutions of the game, we now consider the 
i i i f k j  <  1 
special case of C , = C n k f  with Cn = 1 and cr(fc,) = l-£, = < , 
' 
j  ~  L ,  H  .  This specification assures that c ' ( k j } >  0, c"(k}^ > 0 , a' (kL)< 0 , and 
a  ( k H  ) > 0 . Also, this specification satisfies the SOC's in the quality-choosing 
equilibrium. The two local maxima and the global maximum of 11/ , and the 
comparative static results are summarized in Table 4-2. In particular, in the case of 
"variable externality" where c r ( k j )  -  | l  -£, |  and y}  > 0,  equil ibrium values confirm the 
results that entry qualities are negatively related to the externality parameters. 
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Table 4-2. Examples of Entry Qualities 
Types of 
Externality Local Maximum Entry Quality Comparative Static Analysis 
"Variable 
Externality": 
C, = kj , 
o(kJ)= 
^ >0 
K 
- 3 
v-i+67" 
nr(v)4(^J 
2 
if 
2 
^'>0, ^ "'>0 
se se 
ai
''<o,8*»"<o 
«nf(*0.0 
ag aa 
anf(*;) o en,»(*„•).„ 
No 
Externality: 
C, = kj , 
r, =o 
, * , 0 
~ y 
"•'(vi-K'-fj 
"•'M-Kfï 
k *  - k L  if <? < ~ 
k *  ~ k H  if 0  > — 
2 
<>o,  <>0 
aa ag 
anf(V) ,o enf(V).0 
eg ag 
Note that the above examples apply only to the range of the parameter 0_ which 
ensures that the duopoly actually covers the market. In order for the duopoly market to 
be fully covered at the market equilibrium, one must check whether these solutions 
satisfy constraints (14) and (15). In the case of "variable externality", if entry occurs 
with an inferior quality, the duopoly condition (14) is - e i A ~~ ^ + 3 j and the 
+8y,+16)-(y,+12) 
covered-market restriction (15) is 0 > — . If entry occurs 
Z 
with a superior quality, the duopoly condition is 0 e TH, +—\ and the covered-
v 
i  +  -  •  n  3^3(5-2y H )  +  2 y H  -9 . 
market restriction is 0 > — . Because entry occurs with an inferior 
2 
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quality when 9_ < + ^ + ^ or vice versa, for the special case of yL = yH = 1, the 
duopoly covered-market segmentation at the market equilibrium can be illustrated as 
Figure 4.4. 
e Sao 
2 1 11 g 
4 2 2 
Inferior-Quality Entry Superior-Quality Entry 
Figure 4.4 Equilibrium Market Segmentation: Case of Variable Externality with 
= r# = 1 
In the absence of externality, if entry occurs with an inferior quality, the duopoly 
condition (14) is 9el-^, 3j and the covered-market restriction (15) is 
3(V3-l)  
9_ > ——-—- « 1.0981. If entry occurs with a superior quality, the duopoly condition is 
,  \  3(VÎ5-3) 
9 e (0, 9) and the covered-market restriction is 9 > —— « 1.3095. Because entry 
3 
occurs with an inferior quality when 9 < — or vice versa, the duopoly covered-market 
segmentation at the market equilibrium can be illustrated as Figure 4.5. 
< X) 
3(V3-l)  3  
2 2 
V 
9 9 
V ~V 
Inferior-Quality Entry Superior-Quality Entry 
Figure 4.5 Equilibrium Market Segmentation: Case of No Externality 
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As we see, entry quality will be superior relative to the existing variety if 
7 5 
4' 2 
entails consumers are sufficiently homogeneous. Note that the range d e 
superior-quality entry in the case of no externality, and inferior-quality entry when the 
segregation cost externality is present (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5). Therefore, the existence 
of a segregation cost externality "biases" entry decisions in favor of low-quality entry. 
4.4 Welfare Evaluation 
In this section, we consider how an individual consumer is affected by the 
changes in externality parameters. Changing y s has a negative effect on the individual 
consumer surplus by increasing product prices. However, the direction of a quality 
change is ambiguous. That is, when entry occurs with a low-quality good, the change in 
individual consumer surplus of the low-type consumer with respect to the externality 
parameter becomes: 
(27) ) = ^  {-2c' (&/) - ) +1 + 32 - - o" (*/ ) 
and, for the high-type consumer, it is 
(28) { - < ' ( & !  ) - )  +  2  +  - 2 < r )  
When entry occurs with a high-quality good, the change in individual consumer surplus 
of the low-type consumer with respect to the externality parameter becomes: 
(29) ^ ^ {-c' (V ) - ) -1+- o" (V ) 
and, for the high-type consumer, it is 
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(30) [ 0 k H  - P l  {-2 c ' ( k H  )-2 y H < y ' { k H  ) - 2 + 3<9 - # j—- 2 a  ( k H  )  
Now, to sign how individual consumer surplus is affected by the externality 
parameters, consider the special case of the previously established example of variable 
externality associated with convex costs. When entry occurs with the low-quality good, 
for all 6 G [#, 1 + #9] and for all 0_ in the appropriate interval, we have: 
(27)' 
(28)' 
lm * n*\ 96 — 10 + 3 + 1y, 1 z »\ 10# — 9# —12 — 10 y I  K -a  ) - — ) - j "  27 
<0 <0 
d  (g-p;)  =  -g+ 6 + 8^-la(t ;)„5g-2 4 '1 4^<0 
27 
<0 <0 
Therefore, effects on the individual consumer surplus in response to the increase in yL 
are negative. At the same time, the market share for the low-quality good 1 is enlarged 
as yL increases, because now the marginal consumer <910 who is indifferent between 
buying a low-quality good 1 and buying a high-quality good 0 is located on the right-
hand side of the original point on the line of a taste parameter 0 : 
(31) 
/ p* _ p' ^  
r0 
1 — At, L  J  
7g + 6 + 2y, 
l  v 
=  - > 0  
9 
However, for the high-quality entry, effects on the individual consumer surplus 
in response to the increase in yH are ambiguous: 
(29)' t e - p ; \  =  9 + r » - - - x - a ( k  - ) = 9 - 4 g + 4 r -
\ / 27 3 \ 27 
">o" <0 
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(30)' J L - f a  • _ p : ) J *  +  2 r . + W - 9 0 _ 2  ,  . . i - M  +  U  +  l r ,  
dr.* > 27 3 V « /  27 
' 
H 
" , " v ' 
>0 <0 
because 6 e [<9, 1 + 5] and 0 < yH + ~ from the duopoly constraint.14 Note that, in this 
case, the market share for the low-quality good 0 is enlarged as yH increases: 
2 (32) _ _É_ Pi -Po d ("7^ + 9 + 2/^^ 
V kh -  1 j  y 
> 0  
9 
These are addressed in the following result. 
Result 2. With convex quality costs and variable externality such that C, = and 
a ( k j )  = |l - k j | for j  =  L ,  K ,  
(a) when entry occurs with the low quality, all consumers lose from the increase in 
segregation costs; 
(b) however, when entry occurs with the high quality, some consumers may have 
benefits from the increase in segregation costs; 
(c) in both entry regimes, the market share for the low-quality good is enlarged. 
4.5 Concluding Remarks 
A duopoly model associated with VPD is developed to show how the existence 
of segregation costs biases the firm's quality choice behavior in the covered market 
setting. The entrant chooses the degree to which it differentiates its product from an 
already existing one. With an increasing and convex cost of quality, the model predicts 
that the entrant firm has an incentive to enter the market with a low-quality good to 
reduce production costs when the values of externality parameters are sufficiently high, 
14 Note that equation (29)' is negative if 9 > ^ + yH , and the equation (30)' is negative if 
0_ < 10.8-8yH for given 6 = 3.2. 
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or vice versa. When consumers are homogeneous enough, entry may occur with a high-
quality good. The model also explains that how consumers are affect by the increase in 
segregation inefficiency. In our specific example associated with the convex quality 
costs and variable externality, we found that all consumers lose from the increase in 
segregation costs when the entry occurs with the low-quality good. 
In this entry model, unlike the standard duopoly VPD models where a firm 
designated as a low type is not allowed to choose a high type of product, we see how 
firms choose inferior or superior technology. In particular, quality-dependent costs occur 
in the second stage of the game when actual production takes place. Thus, quality and an 
externality parameter determine prices directly through variable costs. Literally, the 
result confirms that the high-quality advantage does not necessarily hold with the 
introduction of quality-dependent marginal production costs. Also, by the introduction 
of a quality-dependent marginal production cost, we have shown that equilibrium 
qualities could be internal to the interval of possible qualities, rather than maximally 
differentiated (or unbounded) as in Tirole's (1988) covered market setting. That is, if 
marginal costs are too high relative to product qualities, such innovations will not be 
undertaken. By contrast, if an entry quality is too low, such goods will not be sold in the 
market. Thus, there exist finite solutions of entry qualities. 
Some remaining issues related to these results can be mentioned as a guide for 
future research. A natural question to ask is whether the equilibrium outcome can be 
improved from a social point of view. To answer this question, first of all, it would be 
interesting to evaluate market equilibrium values of entry qualities in terms of social 
welfare criteria. That is, we need to characterize the direction of socially optimal quality 
choices, and the optimal level of entry qualities conditional on the chosen quality 
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direction. However, the use of corrective taxes, subsidies, or regulations to improve 
social welfare is feasible only if the quality is observable. Thus, the case where qualities 
are not verifiable or very costly to verify, especially when GM product quality is 
concerned due to the presence of imperfect grading and contamination problem, would 
be an interesting subject for the future research. 
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Appendix. Sufficient Conditions for Equilibrium Qualities to be 
Unique Profit Maximizers 
Maximization of profit Ff , with respect to kj, j = L, H yields the following 
first order conditions: 
(A.1) = = 0 
(A. 2) ^ = = 0 
where = -, + + 
G [ K H  j  =  — — ,  H ( k H  ^  =  2  +  6  +  A h  -2 \ c ' [ k H  }  +  Y H < ? ' { k H  )j .  
Knowing that D^k*^ > 0 and G(X/j > 0 by the parameter restrictions of the 
non-drastic innovation where these restrictions guarantee positive demands of two goods 
in the product market equilibrium, the entry quality will be determined by L ( k, j = 0 if 
the entry occurs with an inferior quality and H  [ k , * ^  = 0 if the entry occurs with a 
superior quality. Then the SOCs require: 
(A. 3) ^ 
L ' ( k *  j-21 T L c r " [ k *  j -  c " [ k *  jj + ^=-<0 (because L (kL* ) = 0 and 
(A. 4) ^ 
H
'  ^
k
" )=  l f c ~  ~ 2 lC" {k^) + r»e7"{k« )}<0 (because H { k H '  ) = 0 and G { k H *  )  >  o) 
Therefore, the SOCs can be rewritten as: 
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(A. 3)' c"^<r" (t/) > 1 
(A. 4)' c"(t/) + ra<T"(t,/)>j 
V d k H  j  
To sign (A. 3)' and (A. 4)', we use D ^ k L *  ) > 0 and G { k H ' ^  > 0 . That is, L { k *  j = 0 
implies the inequality A,. +1 - Û - 2 j/La'{kL j - c'[kL j + A, | > 0 and hence 
d k ,  
' { k l  )~ c ' ( k l  )  +  A r  
(l-*l  )  
> 0. Likewise, H (&,/ j = 0 implies the inequality 
2 + 6- AH = 2 |c' ( k H *  ) + YH<7' [KFJ* ) - Aff j > 0 and hence 
—— = — —,—;—\— > 0 . Therefore, the signs of (A. 3)' and (A. 4)' are 
at* -i) 
positive. 
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CHAPTER 5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
5.1 A General Discussion 
This dissertation consists of two essays using game theoretic approaches in the 
area of industrial organization. In chapter 2, I introduced static models of a market for 
differentiated products to analyze quality-choice behavior of the firm under various 
scenarios. Chapter 3 looks at the potential for the use of quality choice as an entry 
deterrence strategy in a sequential entry game. Chapter 4 investigates the potential for 
product segregation costs to bias the firm's quality-choice behavior. Throughout the 
dissertation I seek theoretical and practical contributions, by investigating partial or 
complete disagreements between homogeneous and heterogeneous product market 
analyses. 
The main idea explored in this dissertation is rooted in Shaked and Sutton 
(1982) where firms decide whether to enter, then (if they enter) what qualities to produce, 
and finally what price to charge, given qualities. Their VPD model is characterized by a 
"finiteness" or "natural oligopoly" property where at most two firms are sustainable in 
non-cooperative equilibrium for the game in which firms have positive profits. One firm 
chooses the lowest possible quality level. The other firm chooses the highest possible 
quality level. This is similar to the "principle of maximum differentiation" which 
appears in Hotelling-type spatial models with quadratic transportation costs. In 
particular, in this type of equilibrium, the firm choosing to produce the high-quality good 
earns higher profits in equilibrium than does the low-quality firm. Thus, if there is an 
entrant, the new innovation would be always superior to the existing variety because the 
entrant firm wants to have high-quality advantage. 
101 
I extended the model of Shaked and Sutton (1982) in a few different directions. 
Among them, the most noticeable feature is the introduction of variable costs of 
production, which is quality-dependent. The common approach in Shaked and Sutton 
(1982) type of VPD models has been to assume that quality improvement costs are fixed. 
Thus, the marginal cost of quality itself may vary, but the marginal cost of production (or 
the variable cost) does not change with product qualities. Whereas this assumption can 
reflect the situation where firms should engage in R&D or advertising activities to 
improve qualities, this formulation cannot reflect the variable-cost aspects of quality 
improvement where the higher quality good is more expensive to manufacture due to, for 
instance, requirements of more skilled labor or more expensive raw materials and inputs 
(e.g., Mussa and Rosen's (1978) monopoly model). Importantly, the "high-quality 
advantage" need not hold with the assumption of quality-dependent marginal production 
costs. Therefore, by allowing quality-dependent marginal production costs, I allowed for 
the possibility of inferior innovation relative to the existing variety (e.g., the first 
generation of 'genetically modified' agricultural products, canned foods, furniture, and 
musical instruments). The main findings of the dissertation are as follows. 
In chapter 2, I clarify the monopoly and duopoly demand structure and the 
associated product market equilibrium under the covered market configuration. In 
particular, parameter restrictions on the duopoly covered market are suggested by the 
degree of relative consumer heterogeneity. 
The "entry-deterrence model" in chapter 3 analyzes the entry of a new product 
into a vertically differentiated market where an entrant and an incumbent compete in 
prices. I consider sequential instead of simultaneous entry to study the leader-follower 
aspect of the game between firms. With a sequential choice of quality, quality-
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dependent marginal production costs, and a fixed entry cost, I relate the entry-quality 
decision and the entry-deterrence strategies to the level of entry cost and the degree of 
consumer heterogeneity. In particular, the incumbent influences the quality choice of the 
entrant by choosing its quality level before the entrant. This allows the incumbent to 
limit the entrant's entry decision and quality levels. Quality-dependent marginal 
production costs in the model allow for the possibility of inferior-quality entry as well as 
the incumbent's aggressive entry-deterrence strategies by increasing its quality level 
towards potential entry. First, for sufficiently low fixed entry costs, entry is 
accommodated and the entrant's choices are indifferent between entry with an inferior 
quality and entry with a superior quality. In this case, the incumbent selects a quality 
that is higher than the monopolist's choice. Second, if the entry cost is in a certain 
moderate range, the incumbent engages in entry deterrence by increasing her product 
quality before the entrant enters the market. Third, if the entry cost is very high, entry is 
efficiently blockaded and the incumbent chooses the pure monopolist's quality level. 
Fourth, it is shown that while the consumer surplus is higher when entry is 
accommodated than in the absence of entry, the maximum total welfare is not necessarily 
associated with the accommodated entry. In particular, the maximum welfare of the 
relatively homogenous consumers is attained at the fixed cost level, where entry is 
deterred. Fifth, for a certain level of fixed entry costs, there are too many varieties in the 
economy relative to the social optimum. We also showed that Stackelberg firms 
associated with accommodated entry excessively differentiate product qualities to reduce 
price competition. 
The "externality model" in chapter 4 focuses on the potential entrant's R&D 
behavior rather than the entry-deterrence strategies of the incumbent, in a vertically 
differentiated product market. This model is motivated by some current economic 
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questions arising from the advent of 'genetically modified' (GM) agricultural product 
markets, which provides the potential for differentiated good market and gives rise to the 
controversial issues of segregation between GM and conventional goods. By developing 
a duopoly market-entry model associated with the vertical product differentiation, this 
essay proposes an analytical framework to examine how the existence of segregation 
costs biases the firm's quality choice behavior, and to study the associated welfare effects. 
Thus, the key factor of the model is the cost of segregation activities that are necessary to 
distinguish GM products from non-GM products. With an increasing and convex cost of 
quality, the model predicts that the entrant firm has an incentive to enter the market with 
a low-quality good to reduce production costs if segregation costs are sufficiently high, 
and vice versa. When consumers are homogeneous enough, entry will occur with a high-
quality good relative to the existing variety. In the special case of the convex quality 
costs and variable externality, it is found that all consumers lose from the increase in 
segregation externality when entry occurs with the low-quality good. 
5.2 Suggestions for Additional Research 
Product differentiation models are used to address issues where product 
characteristics are not given. In reality, the assumption of homogeneous products would 
be the exception. It seems that specific product markets provide a wide variety of 
products in response to the nature of demand. In this sense, the product differentiation 
approach would be more realistic than the homogenous good market approach, especially 
if consumers do not view goods as perfect substitutes. Therefore, in many economic 
models associated with the homogeneous product market analysis, there is a scope for 
extensions to the product differentiation setting associated with heterogeneity properties 
of the good and consumer preferences. 
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In this dissertation, I used VPD models to endogenize product qualities of the 
firms. The consumers' taste parameter as the determination of product varieties is an 
important feature that does not appear in models of horizontal product differentiation. In 
the following, I suggest some possible opportunities to extend the work of this 
dissertation. 
First, although I limited the model by assumptions such as a covered market, the 
strategic quality-choice model with partial market coverage instead of full market 
coverage would be more appealing, in that it allows for some potential consumers not to 
buy the differentiated goods. In spite of analytical difficulties, further research also can 
be done with endogenized market outcomes where the firm decides whether to cover the 
market or not. 
Second, we calculated the socially optimal level of qualities in chapter 3. Then 
the next question would be how the social planner regulates differentiated firms to 
improve social welfare. The socially desirable intervention as regulatory remedies may 
involve the product R&D subsidy/tax policy, maximum price regulation, and the use of 
minimum quality standards as mentioned in chapter 3. 
Third, although this dissertation is restricted to two types of products, high-
quality and low-quality products, we may incorporate more products that differ in 
various characteristics. That is, it may be interesting to consider more than two 
oligopolists involving many incumbents facing many potential entrants. 
Fourth, the analyses in this dissertation are based on standard assumptions of the 
VPD model which, in some senses, ignores a few critical aspects of R&D activities such 
as uncertainty in innovation and patent races. Future research may include these issues 
under the VPD setting. 
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Fifth, the theoretical application of this dissertation can be extended to the 
particular question related to the advent of GM agricultural products, where the issues of 
segregation between GM and conventional products are controversial and have given rise 
to a number of unresolved economic questions. The analytical supply and demand 
framework to examine the economic effects of segregation in the presence of quality 
uncertainty (due to the presence of imperfect grading and contamination problem of the 
GM agricultural product market) would be the one example. 
Finally, product differentiation occurs in market for services as well as for goods. 
For example, consumers can choose different medical, education, and banking services 
from a number of alternative suppliers. In this sense, we can apply the analysis 
extensively to the various service markets. 
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